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Tiivistelmä:
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on vastata seuraaviin kysymyksiin: Kuinka mitataan parhaiten
vahingonkorvauksen  määrä  patentin  loukkaustilanteissa?  Voidaanko  tätä  metodia  käyttää
Suomessa  sekä  Kiinassa?  Mitkä  ovat  suomalaisen  ja  kiinalaisen  oikeusjärjestelmän  erot  ja
yhtäläisyydet kyseisellä oikeudenalalla? Miksi suomalainen ja kiinalainen oikeusjärjestelmä ovat
samanlaisia tai erilaisia?
Menetelminä käytän lainoppia, oikeusvertailua sekä oikeushistoriallista metodia. Lainopillisella
metodilla pyrin tulkitsemaan Suomen ja Kiinan lainsäädäntöä, lainvalmistelumateriaaleja sekä
oikeuskäytäntöä. Systematisoin myös alalla vallitsevia kansainvälisiä sopimuksia ja Euroopan
Unionin tuottamaa sääntelyä johdonmukaiseksi kokonaisuudeksi. Oikeusvertailulla tutkin maiden
yhtäläisyyksiä  ja  eroja  niiden  kulttuurillisessa  kontekstissaan.  Oikeushistoriallisella  metodilla
luodaan yhteys lainsäädännön kehittymisen ja yhteiskunnan muutosten välillä.
Tuloksena parhaan mittaustavan löytämistä käsittelevään kysymykseen esitän seuraavaa: Eri
mittaustapoja  tulee  punnitta  rinnakkain  ja  arvioida  tilannetta  kokonaisuutena.  Hierarkia  eri
metodien  välillä  ei  ole  toimiva  ratkaisu,  sillä  se  on  Kiinassa  johtanut  yksipuoliseen
oikeuskäytäntöön,  jossa  lähes  ainoastaan  (yli  90%  ratkaisuista)  on  käytetty  kiinteän
könttäsumman mittaamista  suppean asteikon mukaan,  mikä on johtanut  vahingonkorvausten
äärimmäisen  alhaiseen  tasoon  sekä  oikeudenmenetyksiin.  Suomessa  taas  kohtuullisen
käyttökorvauksen  määrittäminen  rojaltikorvauksena  on  osoittautunut  vaikeaksi  aloilla,  joissa
lisensointia ei juurikaan tapahdu. Käytäntöä ei kuitenkaan ole riittävästi tämän toteamiseksi.
Yhtäläisyyksiä  maiden  välillä  on  yhteinen  liityntä  TRIPS-sopimukseen,  joka  epämääräisen
muotonsa ansiosta ei  ole tuonut  harmonisointia  vahingonkorvausten mittaamiseen ollenkaan.
Toinen  yhtäläisyys  on  vahingonkorvausten  rahamäärän  keskimääräinen  alhaisuus.
Eroavaisuuksina Suomen riippuvaisuus Euroopan Unionista  ja  toisaalta  Yhdysvaltojen vahva
vaikutus  Kiinaan  poliittisesti.  Kulttuurillisesti  Suomessa  ei  loukata  patentteja  usein,  kun  taas
Kiinassa patenttien loukkaus on juurtunut osaksi kulttuuria ja uusia keksintöjä halutaan kopioida
ja sitä kautta levittää muiden käyttöön.
Harmonisointi on epäonnistunut täysin vahingonkorvausten mittaamisen osalta niin Euroopassa,
kuin myös maailmanlaajuisesti. Kulttuurilliset erot ovat niin suuria, ettei Suomella ja Kiinalla tule
olemaan harmonisoitua lainsäädäntöä tällä alueella.  Kiinan uusi patenttilaki  tulee entisestään
viemään  Kiinaa  lähemmäs  Yhdysvaltojen  rangaistusluonteista  vahingonkorvausten
mittaustapaa,  verrattuna  eurooppalaiseen  täyden  korvauksen  ja  kohtuullisuuden  periaatteen
soveltamiseen.
Avainsanat: Patenttioikeus, loukkaus, vahingonkorvaus, Suomen oikeus, Kiinan oikeus
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Chapter I
1. Introduction
1.1. Research problem
My main  research  problem is:  How to reward full  compensation  for  injuries  caused by patent
infringement? On the other hand, can the same method be applicable in both China and Finland?
Important questions related to these are: What are the key differences in Finnish and Chinese legal
systems and why are they so different?
Reasons why damages are interesting and important subject for my thesis are mainly the fact, that
damages are money and money is the most important thing to businesses who defend their patented
inventions by litigating. Patenting needs to be profitable to be a part of successful business. If there
would not be a way to enforce and prevent others from infringing one’s patent by damages, there
probably would not be any patents. Some say, that rewarded damages are too low for enforcing and
litigating to be profitable in countries, where punitive damages are not adopted. Some would say
that damages are too high in United States because of these punitive damages, but some kind of
mixture or a happy medium of systems, where punitive damages are, and are not, adopted would
benefit patent holders greatly in both Finland and China.
Why China? China has one of the biggest populations in the world and with it, one of the biggest
economies. China has surpassed the United States in the amount of patents and other intellectual
property rights and their goal is to be world leaders in protection of intellectual property rights.
There is a stark contrast between this goal and reality, which makes it hard to predict and interesting
at  the  same  time.  China  is  evolving  rapidly  and  constantly  reforming  their  laws  and  judicial
authorities. They also have unlimited funding for initiatives that the government deems important.
Finland  is  the  polar-opposite  as  the  patent  law  has  been  the  same  since  the  beginning.  Any
amendments  need  to  be  accepted  by  the  parliament,  the  European  Union  and  several  other
organizations such as universities,  industrial  companies  and the government.  If  the president of
China decides to reform patent law, it will be done quickly without opposition from within the
country.  United States however has been very eager to criticize China’s laws, enforcement and
policies related to intellectual property rights. This dynamic between USA, China and EU will be
discussed more thoroughly throughout this thesis.
2
Major difficulties in determining answers for these questions is the nature of patent right. Monetary
value of a patent is not easily defined. There are valuable patents with major business potential and
impact to patent owners’ business, but there are also patents that provide very little value. Value
depends heavily on the other players within the market1, where the patent holder operates and not
solely on the sales value of the device or method that is patented. Some patents are even granted
invalid due to lack of time and resources for the patent office to examine prior arts thoroughly in the
application stage2. Some companies do not even do business with their patented products. These
non-practicing  entities  use  their  patents  to  sue  infringers  and  license  their  patents  to  other
companies. Some call these companies by the name patent troll. Such business model is not popular
in China, because of the small amount of damages rewarded, but it could gain popularity, if punitive
damages are possibly adopted.
Different cultural backgrounds and power positions in the world of intellectual property increase the
challenge level as well. Both countries are established technological innovators, but the political
and economic differences  are  vast.  China has  a  strong political  leadership with only one party
having limitless power and financial resources, while Finland is more based on democracy and free
market  economy.  This  enables  China  to  make  big  changes  fast,  due  to  lack  of  political
disagreements, while Finland has burdens of multiple different parties and opinions. The differences
make it both interesting and difficult at the same time. It is hard for a Finnish person to understand
Chinese way of living, politics and judicial system. Even more so in a complex world of patents.
Litigation and culture for infringements is also very different in Finland and China. Finland has
only  a  handful  of  infringement  cases  where  damages  have  been  awarded,  while  China  has
thousands of cases annually.  This makes it very hard to even make an assumption on what the
general level of awarded damages is in Finland. All that is certain is that there are very few multi
million damages awards in China and none in Finland. Because of the sheer difference in the sizes
of the large industrial companies in these countries. There should be a lot more cases in China with
bigger  rewards.  Considering  the  popularity  of  infringing  activities  in  all  brands  of  intellectual
property rights, the differences should be huge. I am going to find out why this is not the case.
Empirical evidence and case studies will help to answer these questions.
1 Kasravi, K. and Risov, M. 2007. Patent Mining - Discovery of Business Value from Patent Repositories. Proceedings
of the 40th Hawaii  International  Conference on System Sciences.  [Online].  [Accessed  10.2.2018].  Available from:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
2 Frakes, M. and Wasserman, M. 2017. Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to
Grant  Invalid Patents?:  Evidence from Micro-Level  Application Data.  MIT Press.  [Online].  [Accessed  10.2.2018].
Available from: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
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1.2. Scope
In China there are several types of intellectual property rights that are named as patents. This thesis
only addresses innovation patents and excludes design patents and utility patents. I will be studying
all  the  damages  related  to  patent/innovation  patent  infringement.  These  include  reasonable
compensation  for  the  exploitation  of  the  invention  and  damages  for  other  injury  caused  by
infringement. Third group are punitive damages. They are currently not part of either Finnish, or
Chinese patent laws, but I will still examine them as a possible solution to my research problem.
There are currently two types of litigation procedures in China, administrative and civil procedure.
Administrative litigation means patent prosecution and post grant challenges to towards the validity
of  the  patent.  This  includes  application  process,  oppositions  during  the  application  phase  and
revocation trials. First instance in Finland for these cases is the Patent and Register Office (PRH)
and in China, it is State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO). Civil procedure is the one that handles
patent infringements. Usually the alleged infringer challenges the validity of the patent and also
seeks  a  declaration  of  non-infringement.  In  these  cases,  the  revocation  trial  is  concluded  first,
because you can not infringe an invalid patent. Only civil procedure has damages being awarded to
patent holder in cases of infringement.  Because of this, I will  exclude administrative procedure
entirely from my scope of study. 
Fines and all other penalties or fees paid to public authorities will be excluded. These are usually
only rewarded in a criminal trial. Usually patent infringement is not seen as a crime against the
state. Application process itself has lots of different fees that should be considered when assessing
the losses to patent holder, so they are included as a factor to the actual damages construction.
Revocation, annulment and opposition cases will not be a part of this thesis, even though damages
can be rewarded in those proceedings.
Compulsory licenses are granted in some countries for the non-use of a patent. This means that your
competitors get a license to your patent,  even if  you do not want to license it.  These kinds of
licenses are excluded, but reasonable compensations are calculated the same way as license fees in
Finland3, therefor licenses will be addressed as a method of calculation. Regular continuous licenses
can also be granted to the infringer -as a result of- an infringement trial. These are part of the scope
of this thesis.
3 Patent Act of Finland. 1967. (C.9). Helsinki. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.
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I will include other remedies in connection to damages, if they affect the amount rewarded. Mainly
injunctions or preliminary injunctions and evidence discovery. Injunctions may cost a lot to the
alleged infringer. It is entirely possible that no infringement is found, but your business is shut
down due to  injunction.  It  is  also  possible  that  confiscated  production  equipment  was  used  to
produce or manufacture some other products as well. In those cases, losses to the infringer should
be considered in the damages calculations. 
Costs for the court proceedings will be included, because these costs would not occur without an
infringement.  In Finland these costs are awarded separately from the actual damages.  In China,
there has only recently been a case, where attorney’s fees were calculated by the hour. This case
will be analyzed more thoroughly later on. More common way is just to assess a lump sum that
feels like a sufficient cost for a trial. Hourly calculation for me, seems like the better option. It is
easier to prove and easier to determine overall.
Since Finland’s enforcement  system has not really  been tested in patent  matters,  I will  explore
European Community law in this context as well.  It is extremely fragmented and harmonization
efforts have failed time and time again. In order to compare such a huge jurisdiction of China to
something even remotely in the same dimensions, Europe is the best alternative. 
1.3. Research methods
I will use dogmatic, historical and comparative methods for this thesis to make sure that the subject
will  be  thoroughly  studied.  Legalistic  research  will  be  the  main-focus,  but  I  need comparative
studies to truly understand the Chinese legal system and the underlying principles and practices.
Dogmatic method consist of interpretation of legal norms4. Main goal is to understand the current
state of law in Finland and China. My dogmatic methods will include case analysis on two of the
most  prominent  cases  in  Finland  and  China,  law  review  and  interpretation  of  national  and
international  norms,  and  examination  of  their  application  in  practice.  Also,  the  future  Fourth
Amendment  to  Patent  Law  in  China  will  be  reviewed.  Relevant  international  treaties  will  be
examined and interpreted,  when they are applicable.  Most notable are the Agreement  on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and the Unified Patent Court
(UPC) agreement. In later chapters, I will study some of the main principles related to culpability,
deterrence and compensation. Goal for using this method is to establish the current state of the legal
4Hirvonen, A. 2011. Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan. Yleisen oikeustieteen julkaisuja. 17. pp. 36-52.
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environment in these two countries and in Europe. Second objective is to interpret the rules that
construct such environment.5 
Legal history is a research method focusing on the past, and the effects of said past to the current
norms  and  legal  environment.  Legal  history  is  tightly  woven  into  comparative  method  and  is
essential  in order to understand the vast differences of western and eastern culture,  particularly
European and Chinese legal culture. Legal norms are seen in connection to the society, where they
are applied. Goal is to establish how legal culture and thinking has evolved in the last centuries and
how it has affected their current legal systems, culture and societies6 surrounding patent law and
damages. 
Comparative method is described in legal literature as methodically and theoretically pluralistic.7
This  means,  that  there are different  opinions about  the contents of this  discipline.  This  is  only
natural, since the goal is to usually compare two legal systems that are very different from each
other. Such is the case in this thesis as well. My particular goal for the comparison is to seek the
efficient and useful provisions and to critique the ones that need improvement. In order to do so, I
have  to  examine  these  legal  systems  side  by  side,  in  their  respective  contexts  where  they  are
implemented. Due to Finland being a relatively small country in the world of patent infringements,
a  European aspect  must be included in order to  fully  compare  the legal  system to such a vast
country as China. Problem is, that European Patent Law in regard to damages is not a harmonized
unit at all. This creates a difficult, but interesting environment for my research. Finnish Patent Law
research relating to damages has relied heavily on comparative method in the past due to lack of
case  law.8 European  Community  has  no  case  law  either,  since  the  Community  Law  has  no
provisions relating to measuring or calculating damages. 
In Chapter I, I will introduce readers into my research questions, basics of patent law and the earlier
developments of the two countries. Chapter II is about the regulations and treaties that govern these
two countries and sometimes even unites them. Chapter III brings forth the theoretic aspects and I
will study the underlining principles behind the patent system. In Chapter IV I will break down the
different factors that contribute to damages in patent infringement cases. Two example cases will
also be reviewed to see examples of the calculations that courts do to determine correct damages. In
Chapter V I will do some  de lege ferenda  type of research and present solutions to the various
5Husa, J., Mutanen, A. and Pohjalainen, T. 2008. Kirjoitetaan JURIDIIKKAA. Second edition. Helsinki. Talentum.
6See footnote 5.
7Husa, J. 2013. Oikeusvertailu. Helsinki. Lakimiesliiton  kustannus.
8Castren,  M.  1978.  Vahingonkorvaus  immateriaalioikeudessa.  Helsinki.  Suomalainen  lakimiesyhdistys.  Has  a
comparison to German and Swiss Patent Laws.
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problems connected to my research questions. Finally, in Chapter VI I will wrap things up and
present my conclusions based on this research.
1.3.1. Research materials
I  will  be  using  government  bills,  legislation,  treaties,  statistics,  law-reviews,  articles,  books  of
established scholars, scientific research, commercial databases and case law. I will also interview
Chinese  patent  attorneys  and  lecturers.  Challenges  are  to  be  expected  since  the  language  of
literature in China is almost always Chinese. Also, the freedom of scholars to properly criticize
Chinese legislation and government’s organs and policies is highly questionable. American scholars
do most of the writing in the field of patent law and they also tend to have prejudice against China
due to their  communist  regime and never-ending trade wars between United  States  and China.
Damages has not been the most popular subject of legal literature in the past, but since foreign
companies  are  arriving  to  Chinese  markets  in  vast  numbers,  they  are  accustomed  to  entirely
different  amounts  of  damages  and  therefore  stronger  protection  of  their  patents.  Chinese
government has taken actions to improve the situation, which makes it a fruitful ground for my
research.
In Finland, there is even less research on the subject due to the lack of case law from the higher
instance court, the Supreme Court. Legislative material regarding the subject of damages provides
very little background information for the vague provisions in the Finnish Patent Law. Research
relies heavily on comparisons to other Nordic and European countries. Europe in its entirety is very
fragmented regarding methods to measure damages. Despite some harmonization efforts relating to
intellectual property rights, rules for damages for patent infringement remain significantly different
in every country.9 There is still enough relevant research material to conclude this thesis.
1.4. Definitions
In this section, I will briefly define the most important concepts for this thesis. Patent terminology
can be difficult to understand, even for professionals, so I will explain these terms in a simple and
easy  to  understand  manner.  Intellectual  Property  Law  is  a  very  distinctive  field,  with  little
similarities to other fields. Patent Law in particular is a field mostly populated by engineers instead
9Provisions are not only different, but the study implies that they are ineffective as well. See more from: Brohm, R.
Dixon, A. Galli, C. Hoffman, E. Oliver, J. Peets, L. Shapiro, T. Lund, C. Rossouglou, K. Söderlund, A. Vrins, O. 2010.
Damages in Intellectual Property Rights. European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy. [Online]. [Accessed 14
November 2018]. Available from: euipo.europa.eu/
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of lawyers due to the heavy emphasis on technology. Damages are one of the only aspects of Patent
Law for lawyers to study efficiently and thoroughly.
1.4.1. Patent right
Patent  right  is  an  exclusive  right  to  prohibit  others  from marketing,  manufacturing,  selling  or
professionally using the patented invention. There is a common misconception that patent right is
an exclusive right to exploit the invention. This is not possible in situations, where someone else has
patented some part of the product that you are trying to exploit. There can be several patents in a
single product and they all may or may not have different owners. Mobile phones are notorious for
having over 1000 patents in one small mobile phone. If you do not get a license for all of these
patents, you cannot manufacture, market or sell your phones, even if you have a patent or two of
your own in the product. This has led to numerous high profile trials in the industry. The name:
Smartphone patent wars has been used to describe the situation.10
Important  distinction  should  be  made  between intellectual  property  right  and material  property
right. A patent is not a product that the inventor can own and hold in their possession physically. It
is only the right to say no to others, who want to utilize the patented invention. It is the right to give
or  not  to  give  permissions  to  others.  There  are  also similarities  between intellectual  and other
property rights. Both can be sold, rented or given to others by free or by a license agreement. 
To acquire this right, invention must be novel, inventive and industrially applicable. Patent must be
applied through expensive examination process in the local or regional patent authority. In Finland,
this authority is the Patent and Register Administration PRH. In China, this authority is the State
Intellectual  Property Office SIPO. Most notable regional authorities are European Patent Office
EPO and World Intellectual Property Organization WIPO. You can also file a patent in any other
country outside your place of residence. Even global patenting is possible through WIPO, which
does not grant any patents, but serves as a preliminary recommendation only. By recommendation I
mean  a  recommendation  on  patentability.  This  recommendation  is  called  the  International
Preliminary  Report  on  Patentability  (IPRP).  It  can  be  either  completely  positive,  completely
negative or partially negative for certain claims only. National offices can use this recommendation
as a starting point for their own examinations.  Patent Convention Treaty PCT governs WIPO’s
process.  Duration  of patent  right  is  20 years  from the priority  application’s  filing  date  in  both
10For a list of the biggest cases,  see Wikipedia. Wikipedia. 2016. [Online]. [Accessed 28 October 2018]. Available
from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartphone_patent_wars
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Finland and in China. There are some exceptions to the 20 years in different countries and you can
get added duration for medicine patents in certain countries.
A patent can freely be copied and infringed in all of the countries, where the patent application has
not been filed. The protection is valid only if applied by an application. You cannot file applications
later on to cover important countries, since the first applications form prior art and therefore are
already known later on. You have a one year window called Priority year, when you have to file all
necessary applications  in  important  regions  and countries.  It  is  also possible  to  file  a new and
improved priority application within this first year. All of the applications claim filing dates from
the priority application.
In order to prosecute a patent application in local authorities abroad, applicant needs to use local
patent attorneys.  This can be very costly, but it is required by law in most countries.  Regional
offices grant titles for local attorneys as well. A Finnish patent attorney can become a European
patent attorney by passing an exam at the EPO. 
Requirements are, however, not relevant regarding the scope of this thesis. Costs of the application
process can be seen as a factor when assessing the value of patents and efforts to acquire the right.
In  my  opinion,  the  more  applicant  spends  money  involuntarily,  the  more  damages  should  be
rewarded to them, from entities who did not pay anything for their utilization of the same invention.
What matters is the substance of patent right and how it could be infringed. Most importantly, how
much is the value of this right, how much damage is caused when it is infringed and what is the
value of this damage.
1.4.2. Infringement of patent right
According to Chinese patent law, exploitation of a patent without permission of the patent holder, is
considered as infringement of patent right.11 In Finnish Patents Act, infringement is described as:
 “(1) making, offering, putting on the market or using a product protected by the patent, or
importing or possessing such product for these purposes; (2) using a process protected by
the patent or offering such process for use in this country if he knows or if it is evident from
the  circumstances  that  the  use  of  the  process  is  prohibited  without  the  consent  of  the
proprietor of the patent; (3) offering, putting on the market or using a product obtained by a
process  protected  by  the  patent  or  importing  or  possessing  such  product  for  these
purposes.”
11 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China 2008. (c.5). Beijing. SIPO.
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I  will  examine  different  factors  for  determining  infringement  further  on  in  this  thesis.  Indirect
infringement is a situation where the infringer sells patented technology to a third party. The third
party is indirectly infringing, whether they knew about the patent or not. These situations will be
excluded to keep this thesis compact. Indirect infringement does not occur in the situation, where a
customer  of  the  patent  holder  purchases  and  uses  a  patented  product.  Patent  right  is  simply
exhausted between the buyer and seller. Buyer still can not sell this product further to third parties,
if  contracts  prohibiting  this  were  made  before  the  transaction.  Indemnity  is  a  clause  in  an
agreement, freeing the other party from harm in cases, where received products infringe a patent.
This  removes  the  possibility  of  indirect  infringement  for  the  buyer.  These  are  very  popular  in
agreements related to patents.
There  are  various  levels  of  culpability  for  infringements.  Accidental  infringement  without  any
negligence,  minor  negligence,  negligence,  gross  negligence  and intentional  infringement.  These
levels  are very hard to define and vary heavily case by case.  The more people and factors are
involved,  the  harder  this  determination  could  be.  In  some  countries  like  Finland,  intentional
infringement is also a crime. In China however, only intentional forging of a patent is a crime.
Forging is a way of infringing, but not the only one. Penalties and damages are dependable on these
levels naturally. In Finland, this is clearly stated in the law, but in China, it is not mentioned at all.
This is one of the biggest differences between these countries. 
1.4.3. Damages for patent infringement
Damages are a way to compensate injuries in cases of patent infringement. They are also a way to
enforce one’s patent right. Fear of damages is supposed to prevent infringements from happening.
This is called the deterrent effect of damages. In both countries,  damages shall  cover all patent
holder’s actual losses.12 These include benefits gained by the infringer, reasonable compensation for
exploitation, costs of the litigation and other losses caused by the infringement.
Sometimes, damages are seen as a form of punishment for the infringer, because of the breach of
exclusivity alone. The whole point in owning a patent is the freedom to operate, which means the
freedom to license or not to license the patent right to others. This freedom is no longer patent
holder’s after an infringement has occurred. There is no exclusivity anymore after the technology
has been offered by some other entity or person into the market. So, damages can also be rewarded
by principle, without measurable losses. This approach however is very problematic. In Criminal
12 For China: Patent Law of the People's Republic of China 2008. (c.5). Beijing. SIPO. For Finland: Government Bill
2006. (c.13). Helsinki. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.
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Law, the concept  of presumed danger  without  injuries  is  similar,  but it  is  based on a physical
danger, which patent infringement is not afflicting.  
If  the  amount  of  damages  seems too  difficult  to  prove,  there  is  a  different  alternative  in  both
countries. In Finland, reasonable royalty fee is the minimum amount of damages. It can be very
difficult  to  calculate,  if  the  patent  in  question  has  never  been  licensed  before.  Since  it  is  the
minimum requirement, reasonable royalty must be calculated first in all cases and then add other
damages, if they are sufficiently proven. In my opinion, it is too risky to base the entire system on
the assumption, that reasonable royalty can be calculated in reliable way in every case.
In China, there is a fixed minimum damage fee between 1275€ and 127501€. This will not even
cover  the application  and annuity payment  costs  for  a single  country patent  necessarily.13 This
statutory amount should be used as the last resort according to Chinese law, but in reality, it is used
in almost all cases. This gives a good picture on the uniformity of world’s patent laws regarding
damages for infringement. There is absolutely none of it. Even inside Europe, you cannot find even
two similar countries. Harmonization has simply never happened. This has mostly been reasoned
with the cultural differences, but that has never been a problem in the European Union before. 
Achieving the legislators’ goal of covering all patent holder’s losses is also my goal with this thesis
and I believe that this is not the case, when current legal systems and case law will be examined
further. I also recognize even at this point, that this may be impossible to achieve, but it is worth
researching either way. Different principles will be studied as well. Especially United States has a
system, where patent infringement is deemed as so serious, that the infringer has to be punished
heavily over the threshold of gained benefits or afflicted losses. At the same time, their system
rewards patent holders greatly for suing their infringers. 
1.5. Background
1.5.1. Similar developments in both countries
Fundamental concept of a patent has been the same throughout history of both countries. Patent has
always been an invention with novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. Inventive step
means that an invention is something different from the state of the art. State of the art is something
obvious to a professional in the industry of the invention. This professional is referred to in patent
13 See Lemley M. 2001. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office. Northwestern University Law Review. [Online]. 95(4),
p.4. [Assessed 13.2.2018]. Available from: https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/ Lemley estimates application costs alone to be
10000$-30000$ for a US patent. 
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law as a  “person skilled in the art”.  The level  of skill  this  imaginative  person may possess,  is
different in every country and jurisdiction. China is especially known for having high level of skill
for this person skilled in the art. What this means in practice is, that inventive step is absurdly high,
since even the most imaginative methods are known or presumed to be the obvious choice for
professionals in the industry. Concrete example would be a cleaning professional who supposedly
uses a wooden vacuum cleaner. In patent examiner’s mind and hopefully backed by evidence, a
wooden vacuum cleaner may be seen as the obvious choice.   
Invention also needs to solve a technical problem. In other words, it has to be useful and valuable
enough to distinguish itself as an invention worth patenting. That being said, even something as
simple as new material for a device can be patentable. This indicates, that the inventive step can be
achieved without changes to the function of the device. For layman, this does not sound inventive at
all, but in reality, new material can reduce the production costs, time, wear and tear of equipment
and other significant improvements to certain product. It is also possible to patent a new end use for
existing device or combination of different already known inventions. This is something, that is
difficult for layman to understand as well. These basic concepts of patent law have still been there,
since the beginning of patenting.  
Reason for patents to exist has been faster technology development through inventions.  Similar
starting points led to very different developments until recent globalization and massive economic
growth in  China,  that  has  led to numerous reforms and more similar  patenting  environment  to
Europe  and  Finland.  Both  countries  are  currently  part  of  the  World  Intellectual  Property
Organization  (WIPO)  and  Paris  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property  (Paris
Convention).  Most  important  treaty  from the  damages  perspective  is  the  Agreement  on  Trade
Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS).  Article  45  of  TRIPS14 includes
authorization for judicial authorities to order damages, but it does not obligate them to do so. Still,
TRIPS have had a major role in harmonization of the world’s patent laws in areas outside damages.
Effects on damages calculation still remain minimal at best. Before joining WTO in 2001, China
amended their Patent Law, particularly damages, to be more favorable towards patent holders. This
was the first time China introduced a way to calculate damages for patent infringement.15 So similar
developments  actually  stopped  sometime  between  1969  when  Finland  established  calculation
14 World Trade Organization website.  Amended TRIPS agreement.  Part  III  – Enforcement  of Intellectual  Property
Rights [Online]. [Accessed 19.2.2018]. Available from: https://www.wto.org/
15 See Patent Law of the People's Republic of China 1992. (c.7). Beijing. Communication from the Chinese authorities.
VS. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China 2000. (c.7). Beijing. Presidential Order No. 11 of People's Republic
of China. Earlier did not have a way to calculate damages for infringement.
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methods  for  damages  and  2001,  when  China  did  it.  Questions  arise,  how  were  the  damages
calculated before any regulations? Did regulating affect the practices in force at the time?  
1.5.2. Different paths
Finland became independent in 1917 but the concept of patent right was introduced much earlier in
the shape of royal privileges granted to inventors and importers of inventions in 1668. First patents
in Finland were granted as invention-privileges in 1830s. First regulation and Patent Act were made
in 187616. Patent right was first a reward to inventor, but the right itself transferred to the crown.
This is quite similar concept to Chinese way of sharing the knowledge of inventions to the greater
good of the state. Individuals were recognized, but they were never bigger than the crown.
Later on in 1898 a statute including a provision on damages and negligence was formed.17 It states
that  if  the  infringer  knew  or  should  have  known  about  the  patent  right  of  another,  a  full
responsibility  to  compensate  all  injuries  would  take  place.  This  was  the  first  time  negligent
infringers  were  also  within  the  scope  of  damages.  Before  this,  only  intentional  infringements
constituted this responsibility and liability.                     
China was an independent country long before Finland. They had a strong cultural  identity and
society,  where  common  good,  state’s  advancement  and harmony  were  placed  above  all  else18.
Despite  their  strong  roots,  China  had  plenty  of  civil  wars  and  conflicts  with  western  nations
throughout its history. Perhaps the most famous for its cruelty was the Boxer rebellion in 1900,
where Christians and other Western looking people were killed on sight in vast numbers.19 First
exclusive  right  was  granted  by  the  Emperor  Guangxu in  1882 to  an  innovative  technology  of
mechanical weaving.20 So in both countries, ruler granted patent rights to inventions at roughly the
same time. Exclusivity of patent right of the inventor was not in the interests of the state, so it
occurred much later on.
Ideological differences behind these developments were different. In China, intellectual property
was meant to be shared with all the citizens. It was an honor to invent new technologies, but the
benefits were shared to improve the state. In Finland, nobles and merchants were granted privileges
to boost technology development, economy, trade and competition. These were more liberal ideas,
16 Oesch, R., Pihlajamaa, H. 2008. 2nd edition. Patenttioikeus. Helsinki. Talentum.
17Castren, M. 1978. Vahingonkorvaus immateriaalioikeudessa. pp.22. Helsinki. Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys.
18 Yonehara, B. 2002. Enter the Dragon: China’s WTO Accession Film Piracy and Prospects for the Enforcement of
Copyright Laws. 9 UCLA Ent. Law Review.
19 Zhao, Y. 2018. China’s Intellectual Property System in the Process of Catch-up. Helsinki. University of Helsinki. 
20 Chengsi, Z. 2007.On Intellectual Property. Social Sciense Academic Press. Beijig.
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compared to China’s more communistic approach. To conclude the early stages of patenting in
these  two  areas,  inventions  were  highly  valued  by  the  state,  but  the  rights  of  the  state  far
outweighed the rights of the inventors. Everything was under strict control of the state. Global, free
and independent market economy boosted by patents was still far away in the future. 
To examine the modern-day environment in Finland and China, the Global Innovation Index 201821
is a great report to study. Despite their similar rankings in the overall report (Finland 7 th and China
17th), there are vast differences especially in the regulatory environment. Finland is in 6 th place,
while China is in 100th place. Regulatory quality has Finland in 8th place and China in 87th place.
Rule of law Finland 3rd place and China 75th place. One way to explain this is the diversity of China.
There are many more jurisdictions with varied levels of training, education and regulatory needs. It
is never an easy task to regulate a state with a population exceeding one billion. It could as well be a
matter of allocating resources. China has the funds available for initiatives they see as important.
China  also  has  world-leading  experts  in  various  fields,  so  the  lack  of  talents  is  not  the  case.
Acquiring the best talents in legal field to legislate is a problem, that most countries face. Private
practice is often seen as more prestigious, lucrative and interesting. This is demonstrated well in the
Index:  knowledge workers  ranking is  1  for  China in  the  world.  Basic  definition  of  knowledge
worker is someone, who has expert knowledge of a certain field.
Finland has an environment of very strict regulations on most fields, but the part where damages for
patent infringement is regulated is quite vague and mirrors the EU law’s definitions. Some other
member states of the EU, have taken a very different approach. The amount of infringements of
patents is so low, that it is clearly not seen as a problem and therefore that part of patent law has
remained the same, since its establishment long ago. In conclusion, Finland can be seen as a safe
haven to patent  owners,  while China is  much more dangerous and unpredictable.  This is  quite
natural considering the amount of potential competitors in Finnish markets compared to Chinese
markets. There may be hundreds of competitors in China, while only two or three in Finland and the
products sold are the same.  
1.5.3. Idea of infringement
In the beginning, infringement in China was a method for sharing the innovative technologies inside
the state’s borders. For inventors, it was a prestigious honor to be copied widely. The Confucian
21 Global Innovation Index. 2018. Global Innovation Index 2018 Energizing the World with Innovation. [Online] 11 th
Edition.  Global  Innovation  Index,  Cornell,  INSEAD,  WIPO.  [Assessed  11  August  2018].  Available  from:
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/
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principles governed Chinese life from 100 B.C. until 191122.  These principles set the benefit of
community over the benefits of individual inventors and companies. Knowledge was shared for the
good of the community. Exclusivity was the enemy of the state figuratively speaking. Later on,
infringement was used to also copy technologies from foreign companies. It was indirectly a part of
a larger plan by the government to boost Chinese technology development. Part of this strategy was
to form State Owned Enterprises (SOE), with substantial  funding, to acquire foreign companies
with innovative technologies. Another tactic was to add compulsory license to foreign companies,
who  wanted  to  patent  in  China.  This  gives  firm  basis  on  the  assumption,  that  the  Chinese
government was not against patent infringement. A reasonable assumption is also, that China has
been pressured to be against it by foreign powers. Despite all of this, their system in regards to
damages is very unique still. 
Finland did not have the same national identity,  because they were under Swedish and Russian
rulers before their independence. European influence and industrial revolution forged the basis of
Finnish patent system. There is not a lot of literature about infringement acts in Finnish history, so I
am going to have to assume that it was not a major issue, or at least not a tool for national strategy
to boost technology development like China. If we think about reasons why one would want to
infringe  a  patent,  cost  savings  come  to  mind  first.  By  infringing,  the  infringer  gets  the  same
competitive advantage without the costs of application process, annuity payments and research and
development.
Another reason for infringement  could be simply unawareness of a patent.  The further back in
history we go, the harder it was to get information and conduct any kind of competitor follow-up.
The question of negligence and willfulness was much harder to determine. These reasons naturally
can  be  applied  to  cases  in  both  Finland  and  China.  Despite  the  lack  of  modern  competitor
surveillance tools, there were numerous inventions, that were so famous, that most people would
know about them. Significant inventions had major disruptive effects to entire economies, since the
industrial  revolution  made  some of  the  professions  at  the  time  redundant.  Even  working-class
citizens would learn about steam engines and electricity. Inventors like Leonardo Da Vinci, Thomas
Edison and many others were lauded as geniuses and sometimes even enemies of the state because
of their disruptive thinking and new ideas. 
22 Cheng,  J.  1997.  China’s  Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit  of  Trips Requires  an Internal  Focus and WTO
Membership.  Fordham International  Law Journal. 21  (5).  pp.1979-1980. [Assessed 24 July 2018].  Available from:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ 
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Globalization and free market economy is something that China and Finland have approached very
differently. State run censorship of western companies like Google in China and fierce competition
between  Alibaba  and  Amazon  are  just  few examples  of  the  current  environment.  Finland  has
embraced the regulations of the European Union and the principles of free market with open arms.
Industrial corporations have established a firm foothold in Asia, South America and Africa.   
 
Chapter II
2. Legal base of damages for patent infringement
2.1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
China’s admission in the World Trade Organization in 2001 can be said to have kick-started the
process of improving intellectual property protection in China. Main concern for other members
was  the  rampant  counterfeiting  culture  of  China.  Trademarks,  patents  and  copyrights  were  all
copied inside the domestic markets with almost impunity. United States has been monitoring and
pressuring Chinese legislators and the government constantly during their membership. 
TRIPS agreement is the only international treaty with provisions on damages for infringement. Both
Finland and China are members of the WTO and with it, this treaty. First section of Article 45
covers  damages  for  negligent  and  willful  infringement  and  section  2.  covers  damages  for
infringement without negligence.23 These provisions only provide the minimum level for member’s
legislation. These requirements are very simple and easy to comply with. Still, it was a major step
for China in 2001, since their patent law offered very little in terms of actual protection. Somehow
compliance with very basic means of compensation were a big change. Since members need to be
compliant  with  TRIPS,  the  national  patent  laws  of  Finland  and  China  naturally  fulfill  the
requirements. 
Adequate compensation for caused injuries is the basic principle in TRIPS as well. This does not
mean, that members could not set higher damages for willful infringements. Legal basis for bigger
damages already exists in China, inside their tort law24. Finland remains dependent on European
23 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994. [Online]. [Accessed 6 April
2018]. Available from: http://www.wto.org/
24 Tort  Law of the People’s  Republic of China 2010. (c5).  Beijing. Standing Committee of  the Eleventh National
People’s Congress.
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Union’s laws, which have traditionally been against penalizing damages. Punitive damages will be
examined more thoroughly later on in this thesis.
TRIPS also  regulates  discovery  of  evidence,  which  is  important  in  order  to  calculate  damages
accurately. Solid evidence and means to discover it are crucial in China especially, since the entire
calculation  process  is  based  on  the  quality  of  provided  evidence.  Judicial  authorities  in  each
member state should have fast and effective measures to preserve and discover essential evidence at
their disposal. In the first paragraph of Article 43 of TRIPS it is stated, that: 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority, where a party has presented reasonably
available  evidence sufficient to support its claims and has specified evidence relevant to
substantiation of its claims which lies in the control of the opposing party, to order that this
evidence be produced by the opposing party,  subject in appropriate  cases to conditions
which ensure the protection of confidential information.
If the plaintiff needs to have presented the evidence and specified it, why do they need the opposing
party to produce it? It is impossible to present evidence one does not have, or should not even know
about.  This  would  be  the  literal  interpretation  of  this  paragraph.  The  concept  of  confidential
information  is  not  defined  either.  The  opposing  party  would  most  of  the  time  claim,  that  all
reasonably  available  evidence  is  confidential  information.  If  we  take  a  bit  more  conceptual
approach to interpretation, we may come to a conclusion, that it  is sufficient for the plaintiff to
make a list of possible data, that may be reasonably available and that is not confidential.  They
would have to also know, that this kind of data is in the possession of the opposing party. There is
no possible way of knowing any of this without the opposing party telling them. By telling the
plaintiff these things, the alleged infringer would incriminate themselves. In theory, this paragraph
gives tools to acquire evidence, but in practice, it does not. By itself, it is a vague framework for
discovery of evidence and easy to work around by infringers. In order to fully assess it, we need to
look at the second chapter:
2. In cases in which a party to a proceeding voluntarily and without good reason refuses
access to, or otherwise does not provide necessary information within a reasonable period,
or significantly  impedes a procedure relating to  an enforcement  action,  a Member may
accord  judicial  authorities  the  authority  to  make  preliminary  and  final  determinations,
affirmative or negative,  on the basis of the information presented to them, including the
complaint or the allegation presented by the party adversely affected by the denial of access
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to  information,  subject  to  providing  the  parties  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  on  the
allegations or evidence.
This paragraph grants the opportunity to the judicial authorities to decide the case negatively for the
party that refuses to provide information. In other words, it gives judges the freedom to assess the
case  with  a  limited  burden of  proof  to  the  plaintiff.  This  provision  gives  needed flexibility  to
damages assessments as well, if adopted. It is a very risky road to take however. Sometimes the
plaintiff may be demanding confidential information or information, that is simply unavailable or
even non-existent. There would need to be proof somewhere, that this evidence exists, which would
mean inspections or other more drastic measures to get the information. These same measures could
be directed to acquiring the actual evidence in stead.    
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has stated before in their case 12/86 Meryen Demirel v. Stadt
Schwabisch Gmund, that an international treaty has direct effect in European Community, if the
provision includes a clear obligation, and is not subject to any other subsequent measures. Now, if
we assess the actual provisions for damages, we can see, that there are no clear obligations to be
seen, if we use the literal way of interpretation. Firstly, the wording: “The judicial authorities shall
have the authority to order the infringer to pay” does not constitute any kind of obligation to the
courts. They simply have the authority to order. This is further implied in the second paragraph,
where the wording is: “Members may authorize the judicial authorities to order”. Having authority
to do something is  not exactly  an obligation to do anything.  When it  comes to the subsequent
measures, courts have to take several steps before they can determine the amount of damages or
even reasons to award them. This can be interpreted as a need for subsequent measures. Simply
having authority is not a measure at all. It is simply acknowledgment of power and jurisdiction. So,
even though the TRIPS agreement is an important instrument in the world of intellectual property
law and even patent law, it has little to no relevance in calculating damages or rewarding them. 
National courts cannot seek interpretation guidelines for damages or have any support from the
TRIPS provisions directly. It is also very hard to find a way to breach these provisions, since there
are no obligations.  Member would need to remove damages entirely from their patent litigation
system in order to breach TRIPS. Another option would be to remove judicial authorities from the
field of patent infringements entirely. Then there would be no authorities to give authority to. If we
would change the provision into a form of obligation, there is an obligation to have some form of
judicial  authorities.  Only after you establish judicial  authorities,  there can be authority given to
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them.  Forming judicial  authorities  is  a  national  issue and not  exactly  relevant  for  damages,  so
TRIPS has no power to affect it.
Overall, as a means of harmonizing the world’s patent laws, TRIPS has failed, as have many other
international  treaties.  It  does  provide  a  framework  and  the  minimum  standard,  but  nothing
substantial or new in the field of patent infringements and especially damages. As long as members
have a very basic patent enforcement regime, they are not breaching the TRIPS agreement.
2.2. Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
This EU directive is below TRIPS or any other international obligations in hierarchy.25 It adds a
new component to damages, that is excluded from Finnish and Chinese laws. Elements other than
economic factors such as moral prejudice are considered, when the infringement is negligent or
willful.  There  is  also a  comprehensive assessment  of  all  factors,  which is  a welcome addition.
Article 13 paragraph 1 a) states that:
“They  shall  take  into  account  all  appropriate  aspects,  such  as  the  negative  economic
consequences, including lost profits, which the injured party has suffered, any unfair profits
made by the infringer and, in appropriate cases, elements other than economic factors, such
as the moral prejudice caused to the rightholder by the infringement”.
This is something, that China nor Finland has never adopted. Flexible, thorough and comprehensive
assessment of all the factors involved. There is no hierarchy of reasonable royalty or losses to patent
holder first. Everything is assessed together to see the bigger picture. This is naturally something
that  courts  should  always  do,  but  somehow damages  especially  for  patent  cases  have  been  so
difficult,  that  legislation  has  been  vague  and  difficult  to  harmonize.  There  is  no  mention  of
comprehensive  assessments  in  the  laws  and  courts  limit  their  reasoning  for  damages  in  their
verdicts.
This moral prejudice is not defined in any way, so it could be tarnished reputation or lost business
opportunity or any other possible reason. This provision adds needed flexibility and could be seen
as  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  I  believe,  that  more  different  viewpoints  in  the  assessment  of
damages is better than the somewhat narrow way of China. Having criteria that excludes all other
methods is too limiting. By this, I mean the hierarchy in Chinese patent law, where losses for patent
holder outweighs profits gained by the infringer, which further outweighs license-based damages.
25 Council  Directive  2004/48/EC  of  29  April  2004  on  the  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights.  [Online].
[Accessed 13 April 2018]. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
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Reasoning for having the method China has could be simplicity. Patent infringement cases can be
very complex and the calculation method, where only one method is applicable at a time, makes it
easier for judges. Making things easier works for some things but judging a case at a court where
millions are at stake usually results to loss of money and rights. This is further demonstrated later
on, where I will show some statistics about the usage of different methods by Chinese courts. Over
90 percent of the cases were solved by stating a statutory sum of damages. This is the easiest way to
calculate damages and nearly always leads to patent holders receiving much less compensation than
claimed.
Finnish courts also use a similar method of stating a lump sum of damages. Major difference is, that
there is no limit to the maximum or minimum amounts available. The assessment inside this method
is also not limited to certain aspects or criteria like in China.
This directive also regulates discovery of evidence.  Discovery should be made available,  if  the
infringement case has been filed and the infringement has been acknowledged in a commercial way.
Before this assumption can be made, interests need to be assessed. Discovery should not result to
unreasonable  harm.  Included  in  this  discovery  are  the  names  and  addresses  of  producers,
manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, holders and retailers of the infringing products. Also included
are the prices and quantities of such products. Manufacturing method, which is one of the most
important  things  to  discover,  is  not  mentioned  at  all.  Neither  are  the  customers  or  license
agreements  made with them. Basically  the discovery gives opportunities to the plaintiff  to find
evidence by determining the players on the field, but does not discover it nor preserve it for them.
Just having the names of the companies involved is not enough to prove anything. Pricing of the
products is helpful information for the calculation of damages but it does not prove it happened.
Considering the nature of European Union law as the bare minimum requirement for member states,
this can be seen as acceptable. 
2.3. Agreement on a Unified Patent Court
The Unified Patent  Court  is  a  new institution,  that  is  not  operational  yet  and therefore  has no
jurisdiction. Several member states of the European Union, Finland included, have ratified it none
the less. The basic idea is to have first instance courts in the member states, with judges from other
member states to solve disputes related to a new European patent called the European Patent with a
Unitary Effect as well as the current European patent. The new court system would bring case law
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from a central European court to harmonize the field of Patent Law in Europe.26 This will not be the
case at all though, since the applicable laws will be the national respective laws of the member
states. The fragmentation will definitely stay the same, even after this new addition.
Benefits to this new system are mostly related to cost savings. Litigation can be done in only one
instance instead of all  national courts, that the patent would be in force. It would no longer be
mandatory to file a European patent in each national patent office, which would save costs as well.
Lowered litigation and enforcement costs would possibly affect damages as well. Mainly so, that
getting smaller damages rewards would affect less on the plaintiff, because of the lesser litigation
costs. Only future case law will tell, what kind of damages will be awarded and which law will be
the most popular.
The UPC-agreement has the same wording as the enforcement directive. These European provisions
clearly aim to have different injuries and undue rewards considered together, while Chinese law
gravitates  towards  individual  and  exclusive  consideration  for  each  loss  or  gain.  In  Europe,
reasonable royalty fee is seen as the alternative solution, while in China, it is fixed (and small) fee.
Both  systems  seem to  ignore  prosecution  costs,  negotiation  costs  for  license  agreement  if  the
infringement never happened, and the patent prosecution costs avoided by infringing. Interesting
part is also the European indifference of level of guilt between negligence and willfulness. Chinese
law at least mentions seriousness of the case and nature of infringement as points of consideration.
Only, these points are relevant exclusively, when fixed fee is calculated, so the consideration is
highly limited.
UPC-agreement suffers from the same flaws as other international and regional treaties related to
damages. It has no rules for harmonizing. The purpose of having these agreements in the first place
is to harmonize national laws at least to some degree. Understandably, it is extremely difficult in a
region such as Europe, where the member states have vastly different ways to approach legal issues,
especially  damages.  Lack  of  harmonization  can  cause  uncertainty  and  increase  risks  for
international companies. In a system like the UPC, it will most certainly lead to some laws being
preferred over the others. It will be interesting to see, how a foreign judge interprets a member’s
national  laws.  Considering  the  vast  differences  in  each  law,  it  is  possible  to  have  even  more
fragmented European system than it already is. At least the national courts with their respective own
26European Patent Office. 2017. European Patent Office website. [Online]. [Accessed 14 November 2018]. Available
from: https://www.epo.org/ 
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laws have a certain level of predictability. This old system will remain an option for those who are
too afraid of loss of rights in the new UPC-system. 
2.4. Finnish Patent Act
The principle of reasonable compensation is written in the first paragraph of Section 58: Any person
who intentionally or negligently infringes a patent shall be liable to pay reasonable compensation
for  the  exploitation  of  the  invention  and damages  for  other  injury  caused by the  infringement
(Patent Act 1967). On one hand, this means that all injuries should be compensated, but on the other
hand,  there  is  a  principle  forbidding  bigger  financial  gain  than  actual  injuries  caused.27 As  a
principle, this is very fair and just. In practice it has also worked well, since there are no cases
available in Finnish case law where high damages have been awarded.   
In practice, this means a reasonable license fee.28 This can be determined in multiple ways. One
method  is  to  calculate  the  average  amount  from  license  fees  paid  for  similar  patents.  This
information however is not public knowledge and evidence is very hard to find. Common practice
according to case law is 2-5% from sales prices. This figure is decided case by case and usually
without much evidence to back it up.   
2.4.1. Levels of guilt
Intentional  and  negligent  infringement  are  treated  the  same  way  when  counting  damages.
Unintentional infringer without negligence shall only pay compensation for the exploitation if and
to the extent held reasonable (Patent Act 1967).
This is strange and unique system that is highly questionable. Normally intentionally committed
breaches of contracts, or criminal offences are sanctioned more highly than negligent executions of
the same deeds. I believe, that adding additional damages for willful infringements would be a good
way  to  solve  this  problem.  My  reasoning  for  this  is  the  difficulty  of  not  being  negligent  in
innovative industries with lots of patenting activity. On one hand, patent claims can be incredibly
hard to read and interpret, on the other hand, finding relevant patents from the vast jungle of patents
is  also  very  hard.  Even  if  a  company  knows  who  their  main  competitors  are,  there  could  be
hundreds of patent applications and thousands of claims to read through.
27 See the term “rikastumiskielto” is used to describe this principle on page 314 of Oesch, R. and Pihlajamaa, H. 2008.
Patenttioikeus. Helsinki. Talentum.
28 Government Bill for a New Patent Law. 1966. Helsinki. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Industry.
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Intentional infringement is sanctioned also as a crime. This means higher amounts of money lost to
the infringer due to fines, but the patent holder does not benefit from it. These criminal cases are
judged  in  courts  that  do  not  specialize  in  patent  cases,  so  the  lack  of  sufficient  expertise  and
technical knowledge can propose a risk that patent holder may not want to take.  
2.4.2. Restrictions for damages based on time
Compensation proceedings for patent infringement shall only refer to damage during the last five
years prior to institution of proceedings. The right to compensation for damage suffered prior to that
period shall lapse (Patent Act 1967). This provision can be seen as severely punishing for the patent
holder and strongly favorable for the infringer. Since patent term is 20 years, there is a possibility
that  someone  infringes  a  patent  for  15  years  without  consequences.  This  provision  should  be
removed as it is unjust and encourages infringers.
Fortunately,  Section  60  has  an  exception  to  this  provision:  The  provisions  of  section  58(3)
concerning damages shall not apply if action for compensation is brought within one year of the
period for lodging an opposition concerning the patent or, if an opposition has been lodged, within a
year from the date on which the Patent Authority has decided to maintain the patent (Patent Act
1967). Still, this provision is entirely useless, if the duration of the patent prosecution, from the date
of publishing until the year after opposition period, is less than 5 years. Since the patent application
is published after 18 months from filing, time period until one year of opposition period’s end is
hardly ever more than 5 years. This is another example of favorable legislating towards infringers.
There is no real need for this provision to exist.
Protection term starts from the date of publication of the patent application, which is before the
actual granting of the patent. Subject matter of the published claims can be different from the ones
that are granted.  According to law, both of these sets of claims matter when deciding,  whether
infringement action has occurred. Damages for infringement before grant can only be awarded as
reasonable compensation.  This means that infringement before grant can never be intentional or
negligent, even though it very well might be. This is yet another favorable provision for infringers.
2.5. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China
Chinese damage calculation is also based on the principle of reasonable compensation for actual
losses to patent holder. As previously stated, these losses are hard to calculate. Because of this,
there are several different ways of calculation written in the actual provisions. Firstly, compensation
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can be determined by calculating the benefits gained by the infringer. If this fails, next step is to
calculate reasonably multiplied amount of the royalties of the patent. This provision sets the bar for
reasonable compensation higher than the royalties, contrary to Finnish law. The law does not imply,
however,  whether  this  also applies to  infringements  without  negligence.  In fact,  the concept  of
negligence is excluded entirely from the damages provisions.
Costs for putting the infringing actions to an end are mentioned as part of all kinds of compensation
schemes. These costs possibly cover attorney’s fees, warning letters, court proceedings and travel
expenses. There is no way of knowing exactly what is included, since no description is provided.
This can lead to parties claiming all kinds of irrelevant costs and attorneys billing outrageous sums.
A list of some of the main costs included would clear out this problem at least somewhat. Hourly
rates for attorneys’ fees have only been considered recently as an option. Previously they were only
counted by a lump sum.
Finally, if all else fails, the people's court may, on the basis of the factors such as the type of patent
right,  nature  of  the  infringement,  and  seriousness  of  the  case,  determine  the  amount  of
compensation within the range from 10,000 yuan to 1,000,000 yuan (Patent Law of the People’s
Republic  of China 2008).  This amount  is  1 296,90 -  129 690,39 euros.  Modesty of this  amount
combined with the difficulties of proving the actual losses caused, make this way also favorable
towards the infringer. It is alarming to know, that most infringement cases are actually solved by
using the statutory amount. This means that damages can not be over 129 690,39 euros. 
To get  some perspective  about  damages  amounts  in  general.  The average  amount  rewarded in
Finland’s second instance court, where only 15 cases have even included any damages awards for
patent infringement, is 1,783,423 euros29. More than ten times the amount of maximum statutory
damages allowed in China. From the chart below you can see how the amounts are divided and it is
clear to see that foreign companies tend to get much bigger damage rewards compared to local
companies. This is mostly due to the bigger size of the disputes and the companies themselves.
Later on a specific case between international corporations will be examined more thoroughly.
29 I used Darts-IP to gather this data. It is a research tool widely used by patent professionals around the world. Assessed
in 15th July 2018. Available at: https://app.darts-ip.com/
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Figure 1
To conclude, the Chinese system would work fine with smaller companies, but very poorly with
larger ones. China is known for its state own enterprises with almost unlimited financial resources
and size. Foreign companies operating there are also sometimes huge in size. To ensure proper
protection of patent rights for companies of all sizes, action need to be made for removing the
maximum amount  of the statutory  damages.  It  is  simply  impossible  to  know beforehand,  what
amount will be just for any given infringement. The amounts available should not be restricted by
legislation.  
2.5.1. The Fourth Amendment of Chinese Patent Law
China is preparing the Fourth Amendment at the moment and it has several changes to damages
measurements  as  well.  The  amendment  should  be  passed  this  year  and  it  supposedly  includes
additions of punitive damages, statutory damages from 50 000 to 5 000 000 RMB. Lastly, a transfer
duty of evidence will be added to make discovery of evidence more effective.30 It seems that with
these amendments, China is taking steps towards the American system and distancing itself from
the more European principle of reasonable compensation. Still, the maximum statutory amount of
637 987.702 Euros is quite limiting to bigger international companies and the disputes that they are
usually  involved  with.  There  have  been notions  even inside  China,  that  the  statutory  damages
provision should be removed completely from their system.31 The article refers to same data from
30Li, M. 2018. Resent Developments in Chinese IP Law. 12.11.2018, University of Lapland. 
31Li, X. and Wang, D. 2017. Chinese Patent Law’s Statutory Provision: The One Size That Fits None. Washington
International Law Journal. 26 (2). pp.209-246.  
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CIELA that will be presented in this thesis later on. Overall, it is evident that the damages remain
way too small for the enforcement to be worth the effort and money in the current and even future
states. Statutory method of calculation is by far the most prominent of all of the available methods.
This  too needs  to  change in  order to  achieve  at  least  feasible  compensation.  Harshest  estimate
supposedly claims that damages in current state represent 5 percent of the actual losses.32 Estimate
was made by a judge from Guangdong Peoples’ High Court. To conclude, the problem of lacking
compensation will not be solved with these amendments.
Chapter III        
3. Theoretical background of damages
3.1. Tort Law, Civil Law or Criminal Law?
Patent Law is a complex field and different parties have different agendas within it. Governments
seek  to  increase  innovations  and  disclose  them  to  the  public.  Criminal  courts  want  to  deter
infringers with both financial and freedom punishments. Patent holders want to have monopolies in
their respective markets and ensure that their research and development results are not exploited by
others.  Some  patent  holders  are  also  non-practicing  entities,  whose  only  objective  is  to  sue
infringers and license the patented technology to whoever is willing to pay for it. There are criminal
organizations and willful infringers, who want to benefit from other’s research and innovations for
free. Lastly there are negligent infringers who simply lack the will, knowledge, money or tools to
prevent their own infringing activities. This is a fairly normal business practice. 
Damages are  a  part  of  criminal,  tort  and civil  cases.  Finland uses  a  principle  of  compensating
instead of punishment in all of these cases. China however, has adopted punitive damages in tort
cases33. Recent statements from Chinese Prime Minister hint heavily on punitive damages in future
Patent Act as well34. Usually, in order for tort case to transform into a criminal case, there has to be
social harm. Social harm is basically harm against the society, court system and the government. So
severe willful infringement cases should be able to cause liability of the criminal side. In China,
only counterfeiting of a patent is a crime, while in Finland, every kind of method of infringement is
32Changuan, Z. Peichang, W. 2015.Why it is Difficult to Reach Fair Compensations in Intellectual  Property Cases.
Yangcheng  Evening  News.  [Online].  23  April  2015.  [Accessed  on  13  November  2018].  Available  from:
http://news.163.com/  in Chinese language, so I cannot confirm the actual statement.
33Tort  Law of the People’s  Republic  of  China 2010.  (c.5).  Beijing. Standing Committee of  the Eleventh National
People’s Congress.
34 Chen,  C.J.  2018. China Plans to Impose Punitive Compensation Upon Patent Infringement.  Lexology.  [Online].
[Accessed 11 June 2018]. Available from: https://www.lexology.com/
26
considered a crime. Another requirement for criminal liability in Finland is the imminent possibility
to cause serious financial harm to the patent holder.
Level  of  intent  for  culpability  and  therefore  criminal  liability  also  varies  between  these  two
countries. Gross negligence causes criminal liability in Finland, whereas only intentional acts cause
criminal  liability  in  China.  Traditionally,  these  differences  are  cultural.  Chinese  legislators  see
government’s  interference  as  something  that  is  harmful  for  normal  business  economy  and
functionality of the markets involved. In Finland and in Europe in general, government interference
by criminal proceedings is inevitable and necessary to ensure normal business economy.35
Harshness of the penalties differ also heavily. Chinese criminal law is known to give harsh penalties
for criminals, while Finnish law is very lenient in this regard even on a global scale. To sum it up
simply,  China  prefers  strict  punishments  for  certain  specific  deeds  like  forging,  while  Finland
prefers lenient punishment for all kinds of infringing deeds.
Sanctions in criminal proceedings are also individual,  compared to the civil  side, where a legal
entity may be the owner of the patent right, which is infringed by another legal entity. Naturally
individual persons may also be sued for patent infringement in civil proceedings as well. Prison
sentences and day-fines can only be addressed to individual persons. These cases are very rare in
patent  law. Mostly these crimes relate  to  trademark and copyright  law,  where counterfeiting  is
widely common practice.  Still,  to understand the complex legal environment surrounding patent
infringements, this information is relevant to assess.
3.2. Reasonableness
The concept of reasonableness is particularly vague in patent law. Usually in torts, damages need to
be reasonable to the party at fault. In patent law, however, there are no definitions made in Finnish
or Chinese legislation. In Finland, reasonable compensation for exploiting a patent is regarded as a
reasonable license fee. This fee should be reasonable to both parties36. This is normally achieved
through negotiations between parties, not by judges. Since the amount of injuries do not need to be
proven for receiving the reasonable compensation part of the damages, one could argue, that these
damages are always unreasonable to the infringer. This is one of the rare instances in patent law,
35Lee,  N.  Bruun,  N.  Li,  M.  2016.  Governance  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  in  China  and  Europe.  p.357-360.
Cheltenham. Edward Elgar Publishing.
36 Rantala,  T.2005.  Kohtuullisen  käyttökorvauksen  määrittäminen  patentinloukkaustilanteessa.  Defensor  Legis.
[Online]. 2. p.288. [Assessed 23rd June 2018]. Available from:
https://www-edilex-fi.ezproxy.ulapland.fi/
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where the plaintiff gains an advantage over the infringer. The fact that at least some injuries were
caused by the infringement has to be proven though.
The reasonable license fee is argued to be the best way to compensate the weakened exclusivity of
the patent right.37 At the same time, it is also a punishment for the infringer, who neglected the duty
of asking a permission from the patent holder to exploit the invention. These are both scenarios,
where notable damage did not happen, but the patent right is seen as a right worth protecting either
way. This implies that, damages can be reasonable even without any injuries. Unused patent enjoys
the same protection as a used one would. Some countries have blocked this possibility by setting a
use requirement for patents. If the patent is not utilized in the country, it will not be valid, or a
mandatory license can be given by the state to anyone who wants it.  This creates a conflict  of
interests  between  the  disturbance  of  free  market  and  the  right  to  hold  a  patent  right  without
exploiting it. Exclusivity should mean the right to not exploit the patent just as much as it is about
forbidding others. That is the freedom of choice in any kind of ownership. You do not have to sell
or use your car in order to enjoy the ownership of it. Scholars of Competition Law and most state
officials would probably disagree with this notion.
Another argument for this is, that infringement is always worth at least a reasonable license fee.
Infringers rights are also covered with the “rikastumisenkielto”. This means, that plaintiff should
not gain more wealth, than what they had before the infringement. Determining how much gain is
too  much,  is  impossible  to  define  accurately.  Bad performance,  popularity  or  number  of  other
reasons can affect the patent holder financially even without any infringement.  Losses to patent
holder directly caused by the infringement need to be known, as accurately as possible, before any
level of reasonable, or unreasonable gain can be judged.    
Similar situation occurs in China, when injuries are not proven, and statutory damages are awarded.
Due to  limits  to  the  maximum available  damages  in  this  method,  infringer  can  be  safer  from
unreasonable  damage  amounts.  Plaintiff  suffers  the  unreasonable  fate  here,  since  the  highest
amounts available  are still  sometimes a fracture of the actual  damage. If most of the cases are
calculated by the statutory method, and they are, reasonable compensation is hardly ever paid. This
makes  the  current  legislation  ineffective  for  achieving  its  goal.  If  the  goal  is  reasonable
compensation.  There  may  be  other  goals  behind  the  legislators’  will,  such  as  safeguarding
infringers’ interests and rights.
37 See Möhrig, P. 1931. Einfelfragen der Schadensliquidation imgewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht. pp.419.
GRUR. And Möller, H. 1938. Der Umfang des Schadenersatzes nach § 47. pp.221. GRUR. 
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Reasonable compensation can be achieved by using a method of calculation, which is a license fee
calculation  in  Finland.  In  China,  reasonable  outcome  is  achievable  in  all  three  of  the  first
calculation methods. The only one, that is clearly not reasonable, is the statutory way. Reasonable
compensation can be fully possible with counting losses of the patent holder, profits of the infringer
or license fee. What makes all these three methods unreasonable is the high burden of proof. In fact,
it is so high, that most cases are solved by using the unreasonable statutory method. To mitigate the
high  burden  of  proof,  accessibility  to  evidence  should  be  made  more  effective.  Discovery  of
evidence will be examined with the damages calculations because of this. They are very dependent
of each other especially in China, where the burden of proof is absurdly high and judges are very
cautious not to overstep their boundaries.
Due to all that is stated above, it is easy to conclude, that patent infringements lead to unreasonable
outcomes  more  often,  than  not.  To  rectify  this,  new  methods  need  to  be  applied  to  provide
reasonable outcomes to these disputes. Patent holders are using arbitration more and more, because
they are afraid of the unreasonable decisions of the courts.
3.3. A Theory of Punitive Damages
This theory was created by Benjamin C. Zipursky in 200538. The word punitive means punishing
over the reasonable compensation’s limits. The recipient of punitive damages can be either the state,
or the actual injured party in trial. My opinion is, that patent infringement is more of a plaintiff-
driven,  personal  matter  between  private  parties.  In  patent  cases,  where  infringement  has  been
proven, but the monetary value has not, a remedy of punitive nature may be needed to even the ods.
In regular civil tort cases, injuries are often much easier to define, because they can be measured as
physical injuries or deficiencies of sold goods. Patent’s value is completely different. Sometimes,
patent’s  value  is  completely  dependent  on  future  developments  of  the  respective  industry  and
technology area. Customers and competitors may desire the patented product greatly, or it can be
designed around by every competitor easily, thus losing all the value of the patent. In Chinese law,
there is already a system in place for calculating damages, when injuries are hard or impossible to
define. Problem is, that the amount is too small at best to ensure even the reasonable compensation
the plaintiff duly deserves. This does not mean that punitive damages have to be over the top, like in
38 Zipursky, B. 2005. Theory of Punitive Damages. Texas Law Review. [Online]. 84(105), pp.105-171. [Accessed 9
April 2018]. Available from: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
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famous BMW vs Gore case39, where reasonable damages were set at 4000$ and punitive damages
were 4 000 000$.
Zipursky states  that  punitive damages  are  equally part  of  criminal  and civil  law, where state’s
interest is to deter infringers from committing the same deed later on and plaintiff’s interest is to
have retribution. Therefor plaintiff should have the right to be punitive. I believe that only the latter
should be involved in  patent  infringement.  Punitive  damages  would  only be means to  get  just
compensation,  when all  other  methods fail.  It  should be more of an insurance to  plaintiff  than
anything else.  My view differs  somewhat  from the traditional  American  view of  unjustly  hard
punishments  and leans  more towards  the  reasonable  compensation.  What  I  am arguing is,  that
reasonable compensation is not possible by applying current patent laws of both Finland and China.
Plaintiffs need other ways than current damages system to ensure that their expensive research and
patent prosecution does not go in vain.
China has a history of having harsh punishments in criminal law, including the death penalty. It is
embedded into the Chinese culture, making it easier to adopt punitive damages. They already have
adopted them in tort law as well. Even the Chinese Prime Minister is in favor of the American way
and is keen to amend their laws. The leap from extremely small damages to extremely high is a
huge  change.  Transition  for  the  already  cautious  courts  would  be  slow and troublesome  most
probably.
In  Europe,  especially  in  northern  Europe,  more  lenient  approach  has  been  used  to  deter
infringements and crimes in general. The death penalty is no longer part of any of the northern
countries. Rehabilitation is the preferred way to prevent future crimes. Punitive damages are also
against the principles of EU law regarding patent infringements. It is highly unlikely that Finland
and China would ever have similar systems regarding punitive damages.  
3.4. Full compensation theory
Full compensation theory is based on making the patent holder whole by compensating all injuries
and losses caused by the infringement. Goal is to return both parties to their original financial status
before the infringement ever happened. This can be relatively easy to do, when injuries are purely
physical or relate to faults in purchased products. In patent cases, not so much. It is most times
impossible to determine the cause of lost sales margins, since it could be due to one’s own behavior
or the infringing product or process. Substantive customer data is not often available or even given
39 BMW of North America, Inc. vs Gore. 1996.
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to courts since it is commonly held as a trade secret. Patent holder would need to prove that their
usual customers are purchasing their products from the infringer, instead of themselves. This would
be including a third party into the case.
Flexibility in legislation is needed to add more methods and freedom to courts, when assessing the
overall  amount  of  damages.  By flexibility,  I  also  mean the  time-period  when damages  can  be
obtained. Currently in Finland, the only time frame is 5 years from the date when infringement suit
is filed, unless the suit is filed within a year from the opposition period, which is right after grant.
This allows free infringements to happen for 15 years if timed right and executed with enough
secrecy  that  the  infringement  remains  undetected.  Fortunately,  this  kind  of  system  is  not
implemented in China. There is no incentive to patent if the right can not be enforced efficiently for
majority of its duration.
Time restrictions are usually implemented due to the estimation, that patents decrease in value over
time.  The  invention  becomes  less  meaningful  and  reputation,  marketing,  customers  and  other
factors become more prevalent. It is still highly unjust to disregard damages completely after just 5
years. Damages could be easily calculated with a formula, where the amount decreases annually.
Reasonable  restriction  based on time would therefore  only  be reduced damages over  time,  not
removed.
This theory is mostly regarded as part of private law and especially tort law. Patent law on the other
hand  is  not  exclusively  private  law,  since  governments  have  their  own  agendas  and  interests
involved. Patenting is seen, by governments, as a way to promote innovation that would benefit
consumers  and  entire  industries.  Patent  holders  are  usually  multinational  conglomerates  with
incentives to make money and gain a competitive edge. As a general principle, just compensation is
an admirable theory, but currently nearly impossible to achieve in practice. Due to its general nature
of being an abstract concept, this is hardly surprising or unexpected.
3.5. Deterrent effect of damages
One of the main functions for damages or any kind of sanctions is to deter the actor from ever doing
the same thing again. This can be done beforehand or directly after the deed. In the preventive
approach, damages for infringement should be set so high, that potential infringers would be too
afraid to do it.  This would be possible with a system, where a fixed sum of damages would be
calculated by a formula known to everyone. In the United States, this has been achieved by using
punitive damages, often three times larger than the regular damages would be in Europe or China.
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Courts  have  established case  law,  where  damages  are  very  high  and spread fear  to  infringers.
However, real deterrent effect is very hard to prove as an effective way of truly preventing illegal
activities. Usually, the end result is the opposite. Countries with harsh punishments tend to have
more crimes than countries who try to rehabilitate criminals during and after the initial punishment.
Theory of defiance40 suggests that unfair judgments and too large damages can be seen by infringers
as injustice. This creates rebellious notions against the judicial authorities and increases crime rates.
This  however  is  a theory for criminal  law and criminology first  and foremost.  Applicability  to
patent infringements or other white-collar crimes is difficult,  since the nature of these crimes is
completely different. Some companies may have unlimited financial resources while others could
be demolished by practically any kind of sanctions. The personality of a multinational conglomerate
is hardly the same as a career criminal or any individual person.
Deterrent sanctions are also part of the new General Data Protection Regulation of the European
Union.41 These vary from fines of 20 million euros to 4% of company’s revenue. These sanctions
seem to have created a large deterrent effect, since the regulation has been the hottest topic in recent
years and most companies from all sizes want to comply with the regulation. This indicates, that
deterrence of high damages could work better with companies, then individual persons.
Another question is, are negligent infringers criminals, who need to be deterred? Finland thinks
infringing with gross negligence or intent is a crime, while China thinks that only counterfeiting of
a patent is a crime, and even then, only intentional counterfeiting. So, should principles of criminal
law even be applicable to civil disputes? Would deterrence be even a worthy goal? I would say it is
a worthy goal, but overly large damages is not the way to achieve it.  Better way would be an
effective and functional enforcement, so it would be known to infringers, that what they are doing
would  lead  to  ramifications  more  often  than  not.  Responsibility  and  accountability  could  be
deterrent  by  itself.  It  is  troublesome  and  costly  to  litigate  constantly  for  both  sides,  but  the
possibility of losing or winning based on technicalities, bad legislation or poor judges is a huge
gamble currently. This deters patent holders from enforcing their patent rights, instead of infringers
being too afraid to infringe.
40 Lawrence, W.S. 1993. Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction. Journal of Research
in  Crime  and  Delinquency.  [Online].  30(4).  pp.445-473.  [Accessed  10  May  2018].  Available  from:
https://www.researchgate.net/
41 Council Regulation (EU) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation). [Online]. [Accessed 10 May 2018]. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
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Chapter IV
4. Components of damage calculation
4.1. Injuries
There are multiple  ways to suffer injuries  for patent  infringement.  I  will  divide these into two
groups: moral and economical injuries. Economical injuries can be; lost profits from reduced sales
of  the  patented  products,  costs  from investigations  to  find information  about  the  infringement,
paying license fees to commercial patent databases in order to conduct competitor follow-up, legal
fees  for  sending  warning  letters  to  the  infringer,  costs  for  court  proceedings,  research  and
development costs, patent prosecution costs, annuities, wages of possible in-house IPR management
team working on the case, travel expenses and missed license income. Moral injuries can be; loss of
reputation because of someone else could sell products with worse quality, losing of market share,
losing important customers to competitors, reduced freedom to operate, increased interest for other
potential infringers and bad publicity from possible media coverage.
Damages for all of these injuries can be claimed in both China and Finland, or at least they are not
excluded from the law. In China though, in order to receive damages for some injuries, you have to
exclude others. First group is called actual losses. This includes all  of the injuries stated in the
previous chapter, but in order to receive full compensation out of these injuries, you can not receive
compensation for infringers own profits or a reasonable royalty fee. I believe, that all these three
components can and do occur in most infringement cases simultaneously. There is no incentive to
infringe if there is no profit to gain. Avoiding reasonable royalty fee is part of that profit as well.
These should not be alternative methods.
Finland has more flexible legislation for the scope of injuries, but the amount of case law on patent
infringement is so low, that determining any kind of common practices is really hard to do. Royalty-
based reasonable compensation is always rewarded even without proven injuries, but most times
damages for injuries  are paid on top of that,  without  differentiating them in the verdict.42 This
indicates that courts may not have unified formulas or guidelines to calculate damages in patent
cases. Principle of full compensation only applies to proven and claimed injuries caused by willful
or negligent infringement. European Union law or international law has no means for harmonized
calculation of damages either.  
42 Haarman, P.L. 2014. Immateriaalioikeus. Helsinki. Talentum.
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4.2. Profits gained from infringement
Profits are easier to prove than losses, because they are easier to connect to the infringing activities.
Sold  products  can  be  seen  from  bookkeeping  or  sales  records  usually,  if  they  are  available.
Infringing party would not want to give this information and enforcing discovery of evidence can be
easier said than done. Customer data is often regarded as a valuable trade secret as well. Sometimes
the customer gives their purchasing records to courts for evidence, but if all the customers are not
cooperative,  full  profits  can not  be calculated and especially  Chinese courts  would use another
method to determine the damages.
In China, counting the benefits occurred from the infringement, is the second step, if losses are too
hard to prove. The amount of compensation for unjust profits may be a lot smaller than patent
holder’s lost profits, since illegal copies are often sold for a much lower price.43 Profits can give a
better indication of the true damage caused, since there are no factors involved, where relation to
the  infringement  itself  would  be  questionable.  All  profits  are  a  direct  result  of  the  infringing
product. 
There are several other ways to profit from infringement than sales. Infringer does not invest in the
research  and development  of  the  infringing  product,  when we are  talking  about  an  intentional
infringement. Unaware negligent infringer may invest the same amount as the patent holder because
of their ignorance of the patent that is in force. This may feel more like a loss to the patent holder
than profit to the infringer, but in reality, patent holder has to do the research in order to invent
something new, while the infringer can enjoy the results with only the cost of manufacturing and
marketing. This profit cannot be seen as increased profit, but rather as savings. 
Another way to profit is not paying for the application process, formally called patent prosecution.
For intentional infringer, avoiding these two costs and gaining profits from sales of infringing goods
can lead to much bigger profits and savings than the actual damages that they would have to end up
paying. It all depends, whether the research itself is valuable to the sold product. If the patent itself
does not increase the value of the product, it may be unfair to count avoiding these cost as any kind
of profit. Sometimes the only added value of a patent is the possibility to prevent others from selling
it. Other times it may be a groundbreaking new material, that is 100 times cheaper to manufacture,
43 Sepetys,  K.  Cox,  A.  2009. Intellectual  Property Rights Protection in China:  Trends in Litigation and Economic
Damages.  USA:  National  Economic  Research  Associates,  Inc.  [Accessed  3  May  2018].  Available  from:
https://www.nera.com/ 
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making  the  product  100 times  cheaper  to  manufacture,  while  the  overall  value  of  the  product
simultaneously stays the same.
4.3. Royalties
Royalties have a very different position in Finland and China. In China, royalty-based damages are
an alternative,  when losses of the patent holder or profits of the infringer are hard to prove. In
Finland, reasonable royalty fee is  the minimum amount  of damages,  which are rewarded in all
infringement cases. Other damages can be added on top of royalties, when proven by the plaintiff.
Royalty fee in patent law is the amount that would be recovered from a licensee if there would not
have been any infringement.
Major problem, when determining reasonable royalty fee is that information about other companies’
license  agreements  is  not  public.  It  is  a  well-guarded  trade  secret  more  likely.  Since  average
royalties from certain industries are hardly ever available, other means have to be used. One way is
to count a percentage of sales of a certain patented product. It is rare that a patent covers the entire
product in question, so the proportional share of patented technology inside the device or product
need to be calculated as well. 
Another problem arises, when the patent is a method patent or a process patent. Processes may
include large plants filled with different kinds of equipment. Value is determined on the exclusivity
of such method in achieving the end-result. If others can not achieve the same result by using a
different method, the value of the patent rises very high. This high value makes a strong patent as a
preventive tool,  but it  only creates  monetary value,  when the solutions are sold and the bigger
market share is achieved. It takes expert economic analysis, research and calculation to come up
with an accurate amount for royalties. Hiring these experts is still not worth the risk if the damages
at best are less than the actual expert’s salary. Expert testimony as a reliable piece of evidence is
also all but certain.
One way to calculate the license fee is to use the same amount used in an agreement with a third
party regarding the same patent. Infringer may or may not have the same position in the market or
in the value chain as the third party.  A customer can usually  negotiate  much better  terms than
supplier or manufacturer of the patented product. In my opinion, license fee is the hardest value to
calculate  for  the  patent  and therefore  it  should  not  be the  minimum amount  or  first  option  in
general.  It  should  be  a  part  of  the  general  assessment  of  the  value  and  adjusted  accordingly
depending the situation and other supporting evidence available.        
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4.4. Statutory damages
Figure 2        
Another alternative method, that should be an added bonus, is the method of statutory damages. The
amount available is so low, that it does not cover any of the other three categories individually. As
shown in the statistics from Figure 1 of CIELA44,the damages are almost always statutory and much
44 CIELA. 2015. CIELA is a unique litigation analysis tool which enables IP owners and their counsel to evaluate and
compare IP litigation venues across China and includes a free-to-use web service. Users can obtain statistics on IP
rulings  from  across  China  or  focus  on  specific  courts.  [Online].  [Accessed  24  April  2018].  Available  from:
https://www.ciela.cn/
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less than claimed.  This method is  only available  in China and is  used when all  other  types of
damages are too hard to prove. These factors are quite vague and offer very little support to the
judges. This can be a good thing, and judging by the popularity of this method over others, it is safe
to say that judges like to have more freedom of choice, while at the same time, low maximum limit
to avoid mistakes.  The idea itself is good, since damages are notoriously hard to prove in patent
infringement cases. There are three factors taken account, when calculating the statutory damages;
the type of patent right, nature of the infringement, and seriousness of the case. The type of patent
right  refers  to  three  different  patent  types  available  in  China;  utility  patent,  design  patent  and
innovation patent. Innovation patent is the European equivalent of patent, utility patent is the same
as utility model and design patent is the design right.
From all the types of patent rights, the innovation patent has the most requirements and strongest
protection out of these three. It is the hardest, most expensive and time consuming to acquire as
well. Naturally, the damages should be higher as well. The statutory amount is still the same in all
three categories. This would not be an issue, if the gap between the minimum and the maximum
available amount would be large enough to accommodate all possible cases. Currently the gap is
only suitable for start ups with design patents at best.  
Design patent cases seem to follow the same pattern as innovation patent cases. Most awarded
damages are of the statutory kind and far less than claimed, as seen from the chart of Figure 2 from
CIELA  below.45 Utility  patent  cases  are  the  same as  designs  in  this  regard.  As  a  conclusion,
innovation patents are being rewarded higher damages and therefore serve as a multiplier in the first
category of the type of patent right. 
Nature of the infringement refers to methods used. The more methods used, the more damages
should be awarded. Methods can be manufacturing, selling, advertising or using of the patented
technology.
Seriousness  of  the  case  refers  to  culpability.  Intentional  infringement  serves  as  the  highest
multiplier, while infringement without negligence is the lowest. Conclusion to this is that willful
infringement of an innovation patent by manufacturing, marketing, selling and utilizing it would be
sanctioned the hardest.
45 CIELA. 2015. CIELA is a unique litigation analysis tool which enables IP owners and their counsel to evaluate and
compare IP litigation venues across China and includes a free-to-use web service. Users can obtain statistics on IP
rulings  from  across  China  or  focus  on  specific  courts.  [Online].  [Accessed  10  May  2018].  Available  from:
https://www.ciela.cn/
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 Figure 3
Statutory  damages  in  China  offer  a  sort  of  formula  in  legislation  to  help  with  the  calculation
process. The set cap for the highest amount of damages possible to award is the main problem of
this method. True justice can never be served as long as there are caps this low included in the
provision. This combined with the fact that more than 97% of all cases are decided by using this
method, makes me question the true motives behind this provision and the courts that utilize it. 
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4.5. Negligence
Level of negligence in patent infringements means the level of knowledge, that the infringer should
have about patents in force in the specific field they operate in. It does not matter, whether the
infringer actually knows this information or not. Problematic can be the difficulty of reading and
understanding patent claims. It takes a seasoned patent attorney and a technical expert from the
research and development side of the company to even read a patent application and understand it.
In some industries, competitors may have hundreds or thousands of patent families with variety of
different  allowed claims.  Even knowing all  of  your  competitors  can  be  extremely  difficult  for
globally operating companies.
Slight negligence is a lesser version of this and is only mentioned in Finnish law. It is possible to
settle damages for slight negligence situations. Chinese law does not mention negligence at all, but
it is implied that seriousness of the case would be level of negligence. Negligence in tort law is
usually  measured  using  four  elements:  duty,  breach  of  duty,  causation  and  damages.46 These
elements can be used in patent cases as well.
4.5.1. Duty
Duty in patent law would mean the duty of not infringing any patent rights. This includes awareness
of the state of the art. State of the art is the current level of technology known to a professional in
that particular technology area. Patent professionals are usually not qualified enough to be those
professionals. This means cooperation between patent professionals and inventors, when operating
in patent environment. Prior art searches and competitor surveillance are key aspects to fulfilling
the duty. Time, personnel and resources needed to complete these tasks are very high. This should
be taken account, when assessing the damages for negligent and intentional infringements. It’s very
easy to purposefully infringe and very hard to fulfill the duty and not neglect it. Damages should be
much higher for willful infringements compared to negligent ones.
To get a grasp of the resources needed for a seamless competitor follow-up and fulfillment of the
duty, one needs inventors to read entire patent portfolios varying from hundreds to thousands of
patent  applications.  One  application  can  be  from  10  pages  to  several  hundred  pages.  Patent
language and techniques needed to read it needs to be trained to inventors as well. Aside from that,
inventors usually have their own responsibilities outside of inventing or patent matters. Depending
on the industry, there can be few or plenty of competitors and every single patent application needs
46 Epstein, R.A. 2000. Cases and Materials on Torts. 7th edition. New York. Wolters Kluwer.
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to be read in order to ensure complete freedom to operate and proceed to patenting with any given
invention your employees may have made. Costs can be millions of euros just for the follow-up
operations annually. Most companies do not invest these sums and end up infringing competitors´
patents. 
4.5.2. Breach of duty
In order to neglect the duty, one must breach it somehow. In practice, this would mean that the
infringer does not hire or have a patent professional or anybody with knowledge of intellectual
property rights. This, however, is often not the case. Main issue is the lack of resources, skills and
suitable technical experts for the competitor surveillance. The smaller the company is, the higher
the chances of negligent and breaching actions. Even if the correct personnel would be found, they
may not have time or interest in these tasks.
Position in the value chain is also a major factor. Retail sellers are not expected to know about
patents as much as a large technology corporation with a significantly large patent portfolio. A
scenario may occur,  where the infringer  has no patents of their  own and do not even consider
patenting as an option to do business. Current legislation in China and in Finland is well suited for
protecting these infringers for not suffering from overly large damages. That is a very good thing
but  assessing  intentional  infringements  by  the  same  provisions  gives  a  huge  advantage  and
encouragement to deliberate infringing acts, instead of accidental or unknowing ones.
Another type of breach would be misinterpretation of competitor’s  patent  claims. This is  not a
difficult mistake to make, since patent claims are notoriously hard to interpret. Even expert judges
sometimes misinterpret patents. The scope of patent’s protection is only as wide as the text in the
claims. Claims are constructed to be as vague as possible in order to cover as wide area as possible.
4.5.3. Causation
Causation is relation between actions and effects. If a neglected or deliberate action has infringing
effect on patent, causality is there. The less you do to prevent infringement, the more causation
there will be. If infringement happens on accident, no causation can be found. Negligence can be
achieved with careless behavior or without any behavior. What matters most is the probability, not
the actual deed. 
In law, causation is different from other sciences. Causation in law can be formed without any
actions at all. In patent law especially, doing nothing at all to ensure your freedom to operate is very
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risky. Freedom to operate means the freedom to sell, market, manufacture and utilize your products
without infringing other party’s patents.
Another kind of causation is between infringement and injuries caused. In theory, it is possible to
infringe someone’s patent without any caused injuries. Patent right itself was infringed, but nobody
suffered. This can happen, when parties are in a different line of business. Some patented apparatus
or method can work in very different markets, in exactly the same way. Parties are therefore not
competitors at all. Still, this kind of infringement may be meaningful in the future, if the patent
holder wants to expand into new markets. Law in these cases is preventive by nature and lacks
causation. 
4.6. Intention to infringe
Final  component  after  negligence  is  intention.  Intentional  infringements  are  not  stipulated  in
Chinese nor Finnish patent laws in a deterrent way. Finnish criminal law has the only way to punish
intentional infringements more than negligent infringements. Fine for these crimes is paid to the
State so naturally the injured party benefits nothing from it. This kind of legislation sends a message
that willful infringement injures only the State and not the patent holder. Damages can also be
claimed  in  the  criminal  proceedings,  but  the  competence  of  district  courts  in  assessing  these
complex situations is much lower than in Market Court, which specializes in intellectual property
cases. Fortunately, expert judges can be utilized in these proceedings to help the district judge.
Punitive  damages  would  be  an  option  for  intentional  infringement  cases.  It  would  provide  a
possibility to differentiate negligent infringements from intentional ones and increase deterrence. In
order to justify punitive damages, I would first have to prove that current laws are not sufficient for
recovering reasonable and full compensation. 
First step would be to add a section to the law, where intentional infringing would result to higher
damages, than negligent ones. Currently neither China, nor Finland has this kind of information
mentioned  in  their  patent  laws.  This,  combined  with  the  fact  that  China  only  has  intentional
counterfeiting as a crime, is alarming. There is no mention of intentional patent infringement, or
whether it should be treated any differently. You cannot deter something that is not known to be
bad. Naturally, it is known by infringers, that intentional is worse than negligent, but leaving it out
completely is only asking for confusion and disputes. 
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4.7. Discovery of evidence
Discovery of evidence has been arranged somewhat differently in Finland and China. In Finland,
discovery is regulated in the Act to Preserve Evidence in Industrial and Copyright Civil Cases.47
The court can order a preliminary injunction, if the plaintiff can prove its right and a violation of
that  right.  In this  case patent right and evident infringement  of such right.  Wording in the law
implies, that only court can give this order and no application procedure is involved. This leaves it
up to court to decide, which evidence is important enough for injunction.
This injunction must not cause unreasonable harm to the defendant. Situations where impounding
evidence could cause unreasonable harm, mostly relate  to evidence that is the actual  infringing
product and the patented part  of the product is very small  compared to the importance of such
product to the defendant’s business.
There has to be a risk of such evidence being destroyed or hidden if the preliminary injunction is
not ordered. The defendant has the right to be heard and provide a response regarding this matter. In
my opinion, the risk is there more often than not. If the hiding or destroying of evidence is not done
on purpose,  it  can easily  happen on accident.  My personal  experience in a company with high
patenting activity has taught me, that documents and contracts get lost all the time and original
signatures disappear from the documents because of scanning. Even the most important documents
and evidence can be botched if not handled with care. 
Another  option is  an interim preliminary  injunction  of  evidence.  This  can  be requested  by the
plaintiff  if the injunction action is in danger to be jeopardized in some way. In this procedure,
defendant  gets  no  opportunity  to  respond.  This  is  a  major  exception  from  the  principle  of
contradiction. Principle of contradiction states that parties have to be given a chance to respond to
claims  made against  them.  This  is  a  shrewd and effective  way to preserve  evidence,  but  it  is
definitely not in line with principles of procedural law. However, Haarman and Mansala48claim,
correctly in my opinion, that destruction of evidence would be even more imminent, if the alleged
infringer was aware of any injunction actions made against them beforehand. The actual injunction
will be done by the bailiff, with the assistance of the police, if needed.
47 My own translation from the Finnish title: Laki todistelun turvaamisesta teollis- ja tekijänoikeuksia koskevissa riita-
asioissa 2000. Helsinki. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.
48Haarman, P.L. and Mansala, M.L. 2012. Immateriaalioikeuden perusteet. Second edition. Helsinki. Talentum. P 168.
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There is also a bond needed to initiate the injunction of evidence. This bond is supposed to cover
injuries possibly caused by the injunction. The amount of the bond is decided by the bailiff.
4.7.1. Discovery in China
In  China,  the  discovery  of  evidence  is  regulated  in  the  Civil  Procedure  Law  of  the  People’s
Republic of China.49 The plaintiff has the right to apply for preservation of the evidence, when it is
likely to be destroyed, hidden or difficult to obtain. Burden of proof that this is needed, is once
again on the plaintiff.
In practice, the court assembles a team of investigators, experts, bailiffs and judges and rushes in to
the defendant’s facilities unannounced and recovers needed evidence. On paper this sounds like a
very effective way to recover evidence, but as previously stated, courts still reward damages mostly
based on the statutory method. Since the statutory method is only applied, when sufficient proof is
not available, conclusion is, that evidence is not found by using this method.
4.7.2. Confidentiality of evidence
There  is  a  clear  conflict  in  patent  law  between  confidentiality  and  discovery  of  evidence.
Arbitration is more preferable to a trial because of this. Settlement agreements made in arbitration
are confidential and preserve the confidentiality of the parties. In patent infringement trials, parties
may not want to disclose their methods of manufacturing products or doing business. Under Finnish
law, witness can refuse to testify about a trade secret, unless very important reasons, such as nature
of the case, relevancy to solving the case, consequences or other circumstances demand it.50 This
can lead to a stalemate, where important evidence can be concealed from the court. It could also
lead to such testimony solving the entire case. If a patent infringement has actually occurred, it is
highly unlikely that the manufacturing method used is a trade secret of the alleged infringer, since
the patent holder has used it before. There are other ways to acquire or infringe patented products
than manufacturing though.
External experts or even the patent holder can be used as help to determine the sufficient evidence
on site. This naturally brings forth risks of confidentiality being breached on matters outside of the
infringement case at hand. It is not a rare occasion that multiple different products are manufactured
in the same facilities as the supposedly infringing products.   
49 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 1991. (c7). Beijing. Seventh National People’s Congress.
50 Civil Procedure Law of Finland 2015. (c17). Helsinki. Finnish Government. 
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Patent trials are not confidential by default. Patents are public domain, so having confidential patent
trials is most times not in the parties’ interests. Even though the entire trial is not confidential, some
of it may be. Even if the trial would be confidential to public, you must still reveal information to
the other party. This is basic application of the principle of contradictory. Parties have the right to
know about matters, that may affect their rights. Considering, that parties in an infringement trial
are most times the fiercest of competitors, these trials become a chess game of revealing enough to
win the case, but not enough to reveal your own trade secrets in the process.        
4.8. Case law examples
Assessing  case  law regarding  awarded damages  brings  forth  a  few problems.  Firstly,  different
industries have different license rates. Secondly, the value of a patent is never the same in two
different  cases.  Thirdly,  the  amount  of  case  law  available  is  too  low for  making  any  general
conclusions. In China, the low amount of case law refers to case law published in English language.
I will have to refer to unofficial sources outside of courts to review them. In Finland, there have
only been 15 cases where damages have been rewarded for patent infringement and all of the cases
were decided in a court that does not specialize in patent law. I will refer to one case from both
jurisdiction, where some significant calculations were made to determine the damages.
4.8.1. Beijing Watchdata v Hengbao
Beijing Watchdata v Hengbao51 was decided in Beijing IP Court in 2016. The case was about a
smart password USBKey. The calculation method used was infringers profits. The court considered
evidence from 3 sources. First were sales amounts from three of the customers of the infringer.
Second source was a special audit report on contracts of the plaintiff’s sales to their customers.
Third source was initial public offering prospectus from a similar company. This contained profit
figures of USBKeys sold from 2011 to 2013. Other evidence was recovered as well. The Court
froze  Hengbao’s  assets  for  1  million  RMB  and  seized  two  kinds  of  USB  keys,  along  with
accounting records and contracts.52 This recovery seems to be quite substantial, when considering
statistics on the rate of cases solved, where damages were too difficult to prove. It indicates either
great luck, change in approach or more competent officials in the court. Since the Beijing IP Court
is  a  specialized  court  in  intellectual  property,  this  kind  of  recovery  should  not  be  too  rare.
Watchdata also claimed 2 million RMB based on advertisement on Hengbao’s website, but these
51 Yao, G. and Hu, Q. 2017. Managing Intellectual Property. Breaking the damages dilemma. 271, pp.34-38.
52 CHOFN Intellectual Property. 2017. Mondaq website for intellectual property related articles. [Online]. [Assessed 24
July 2018]. Available from: http://www.mondaq.com/
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profits  could not  be proven, since Hengbao refused to provide its  books to the court.  It  seems
strange, that other evidence could be recovered with ease, but books could be kept secret. 
Calculation was conducted by multiplying sales amounts with profits. Total sales amounted to 4.8
million RMB and reasonable profit was around 10 RMB per sold product. 0.9 million RMB was
added based on the claims about the website. Attorney’s fees were counted by the hours marked on
invoices and calendars. These fees amounted for 1 million RMB. Total damages were therefore 50
million RMB, which is 6,3 million euros. These were the highest damages ever awarded in the
Beijing IP Court. For reference, even first instance court in Helsinki has awarded higher damages
with only 18 recorded cases. A judicial committee of seven Chief Judges were needed to make this
fairly simple calculation. With the volume of cases in Chinese courts, this kind of committee is
probably very difficult to be summoned for every deviation from the statutory damages calculation
rule.
This case can be seen as the forerunner for better protection of patents in China and it received a
warm welcome from the intellectual property scholars and professionals. Recovery of evidence was
good, but not complete and the large number of judges needed left room for improvement. This is
still  a step towards the direction of higher deterrence,  accountability and punishment for patent
infringements. The case was appealed by Hengbao, so the final verdict is yet to be given. Beijing
People’s High Court has the opportunity to set an example or return to the old ways.
Hourly rates for attorney costs were never calculated until here. Since most attorneys only charge
by the hour, this is a welcome addition to decision making in Chinese courts. Correct amount of the
fees claimed can still be assessed when using hourly rates. This is the way in Finnish courts. The
one million  RMB rewarded for  attorney fees  would  have  been maximum amount  of  available
statutory damages for the entire case. This gives a good perspective on the adequacy of the statutory
damages calculation method. The Supreme Court Guidance from 2009 gives judges a possibility to
break through the upper limit of statutory damages in cases where claimed damages reach well over
the statutory limit, while still remaining reasonable. This is one of the additions, that foreign patent
holders would like to see in a future amendment to the patent law. A mere guidance from the
Supreme Court is not enough to encourage judges to breach the limit set in the statutory damage
amount in every single situation, it might be needed.
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4.8.2. Merck vs. Ratiopharm
Merck &Co Inc., MSD Finland Oy, Merck Sharp &Dohme B.V. and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company vs. Ratiopharm GmbH and Ratiopharm Oy is one of the only cases in Finland, where
damages were awarded at the appeal court stage.
Ratiopharm claimed that they manufactured their product using a Huahai II method, instead of the
patented  one.  As  evidence  they  provided audits,  that  had  no mention  about  the  manufacturing
methods. They also provided research reports with no mention about the manufacturing method.
Considering that the method was the only thing they were trying to prove, conclusion is that they
were hiding the real manufacturing method.  At the same time,  Ratiopharm even had their  own
patented solution, that they could not prove they were using. Merck on the other hand could not
prove any losses for their market share. Burden of proof seemed to shift heavily towards the alleged
infringer in this case. Both parties failed to prove their claims and the court had to make their own
decision without much support. It is very hard to believe, that Ratiopharm would have paid for
patent prosecution and protection for the similar method they were simultaneously infringing. Only
reasons would be significant cost savings or improvements in quality. Very hard to believe is also
the assumption, that Ratiopharm did not supervise or even know about their own manufacturing
methods in China.
License  agreement  between the  parties  would  not  have  been an option  according  to  a  witness
testimony from Merck representative. This indicated that the patent would be more valuable as a
preventive right, than a licensed one. Added to that, even small portion of market share would have
been too risky to give to the competitor. Therefore, the court relied on procedural law, which gives
courts the opportunity to assess the amount of damages without sufficient evidence. This amount is
not limited in any way, but it has the requirement of being reasonable. Chinese system only has the
option of statutory amount in the law, but the Supreme People’s Court supports the breach of this
statutory limit, if the case requires it. So far very few courts are utilizing this opportunity.
The  appeal  court  finally  decided  to  set  damage  amount  to  250 000 euros.  316 696 euros  was
claimed by the plaintiff initially. This seems fair, when considering the lack of evidence provided in
this  case.  The  evidence  was  probably  in  Ratiopharm’s  possession,  because  no  pharmaceutical
company would operate without knowing exactly how their products were manufactured. Merck
simply could not access this evidence.  This case demonstrates well,  how expert  testimonies are
ignored, if other written evidence does not fully support it.  First instance court seemed to favor
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expert  testimonies  much  more  than  the  appeal  court.  It  definitely  highlights  the  difficulties  in
acquiring evidence. The regulations are there for preserving and receiving evidence from the other
party, but in practice, all relevant pieces of evidence are never found or presented to courts.
In Finland, there is a principle of free consideration of evidence for judges. This means, that the
court is not bound to the presented evidence in their overall  assessment of the case. Court may
choose to ignore some, or all of the evidence, or prefer one piece of evidence over the other. This
gives the option of making a decision even without evidence. This ended up being exactly what
happened in this case.
Courts in Finland also have an obligation to make a decision in every case. The easy way out is
dismissing the case all together, due to lack of evidence. This has also been the case plenty of times
before.53 Naturally, some of the cases were also dismissed due to the lack of evidence about the
infringement itself.  It is not even possible to assess the damages without such proof. This case
highlights the problematic nature of damage calculations quite well. What makes this case even
more interesting is the fact that it has the highest damages awarded, while no solid evidence was
provided. As this is only an individual case, no conclusions towards the lack of evidence leading to
greater rewards can be made. It is still a valid assumption, that the opposite result is more likely.
Weaker evidence leads to smaller damages.
It is very rare to see a foreign large corporation in litigation for patent infringements in Finland.
Usually these cases are settled outside of courts or arbitrated in some other country. Lack of case
law from Finnish courts makes it very risky endeavor to litigate here. Especially considering the
weak evidence, it is a miracle, that this case went to court at all. It is safe to assume that mitigation
efforts failed or the companies did not reach an agreement in any other way than court proceedings.
Magnitude of the case played a big role in the amount of damages. The volumes of the products and
prices  were  higher  than  most  cases  and  the  parties  involved  were  multinational  corporations.
Pharmaceutical industry is also known for higher damages and higher litigation rates worldwide, as
you can see from the figure below from PwC’s Patent Litigation Study 2017.54 
53 Supreme  Court  cases  23.1.1929/238,  4.5.1936/1209,  2.3.1938/528,  6.11.1939/2342,  14.9.1955/2647-2649,
26.5.1977/1377. See more from these cases: Kemppinen, J. 1981. Immateriaalioikeudellisia oikeustapauksia. Jyväskylä.
Gummerus.
54 PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2017. 2017 Patent Litigation Study Change on the horizon?  pp.19. [Online]. [Accessed 15
November ]. Available from: http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
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Figure 5
Important thing to notice here is that this figure is based on only cases litigated in the United States.
Figures from China, Finland or any other region or country could be entirely different. Interesting
thing to note as well is the fact that Merck has received the highest damages ever in the US, 2.5
billion dollars.
Chapter V
5. Solutions
So far,  I  have pointed out several problems without  many solutions.  In this  last  chapter,  I will
propose solutions to these problems one at a time. These solutions are my idea of best practices for
counting damages in a just way. I believe that both Finland and China have their good and bad
regulations and rules. Both of them are too limiting in the ways that judges could approach the
matter. Still, both believe in the same end result: Full compensation without unreasonable profits or
losses  to  either  side.  This  is  a  worthy  goal,  that  I  can  relate  to  as  well.  I  will  use  the  same
nominators as in Chapter IV to keep the structure clear.
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5.1. Injuries
In  the  current  and  the  future  world,  good  reputation  and  good  will  is  key  to  success  for  all
companies  big and small.  There are less corporations with high pollution,  child labor and poor
treatment of staff and competitors. Morality effects majorly to businesses and should definitely be
part  of  the  injuries  possible  from  patent  infringement.  Patent  holder  has  no  control  over  the
manufacturing  conditions,  quality,  safety  or  any  other  circumstances  of  the  infringer.  This
combined with the possibility of someone or even large populations mixing the infringing product
and company to the patent holder, is an injury, that can not be ignored by legislators. 
Naturally, same applies to the infringer. Being exposed to the public as an infringer and a criminal
is often very bad and even crippling to business. In Finland, bad publicity is considered a factor,
that can lower the sentence in criminal cases. Mitigating factors are usually excluded in patent laws.
Court assesses mitigating circumstances case by case. This can be a good thing or a bad thing. If the
court can assess the situation without any guidelines from the law, legislative reforms in this aspect
are not needed. In China, it is not mandatory to follow a higher courts’ preliminary rulings. Most
effective  way  there  would  certainly  be  to  include  provisions  of  moral  injuries  and  a  list  of
mitigating factors as well.
Different  combinations  of injuries  should be made available  for simultaneous consideration  for
courts. In Finland this means also alternative solutions, when reasonable royalty fee is too hard to
determine. In China this would mean the removal of hierarchy inside the damages provisions. All
injuries and gains should be part of an overall assessment of the situation. Calculation of the value
of a patent or infringement is very difficult in general, but impossible if only one injury type is
considered at a time, if there are multiple factors simultaneously affecting the situation.
5.2. Profits gained from infringement
In Finland, there is no obligation to surrender profits to the patent holder in full. The profits have to
be connected to the losses in some relevant way. This connection could be phrased as the necessary
causality, otherwise known as conditio sine qua non.55
Profits are occurring if the costs of manufacturing, marketing, delivering and selling the patented
invention are less than the value of sold products. This equation is quite simple and does not need
explanation  in  a  detailed  provision.  Evidence  for  profits  has  to  be  available.  Still,  it  is  rarely
55Kivimäki, T. Ylöstalo, M. 1973. Suomen siviilioikeuden oppikirja. Third edition. pp.480-481. Porvoo. WSOY.
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recovered. Every company keeps a record of sold individual products, even if it does not show in
their financial statements.
The patent can be a small part of a complex machine or equipment, which makes it a little bit harder
to determine. Value could be based on the proportional size of the invention inside the device, or an
estimate of proportional effect on functionality. If the invention is an integral part of the device, or
the  only  thing  that  makes  the product  run for  example,  size is  not  a  good way of  measuring.
Comparing it to other products or inventions is also hard, because there can not be a similar product
to the patented one. At least not similar enough to compare. Question is: Is it fair to estimate the
value based on the available data? I believe it is and should be. The wording in China is: “If the
profits  are  too  hard  to  prove.”  This  removes  all  responsibility  from  the  courts  to  make  an
assessment, based on limited evidence or difficulties to obtain such evidence.
5.3. Royalties
Royalties are determined differently in every industry. Highest royalty rates have traditionally been
in the medical industry. It is impossible to make a provision or a formula for counting royalties
because of this. Usually some kind of industry standard rate is used. Industry standard and patent
are usually completely opposite of each other. Patent has to be something, that is distinguished from
the industry standard to even fulfill the inventive step requirement in the first place. Only way to
reliably and accurately count reasonable royalty rate is to compare license agreements made for the
same patent,  with third parties. Even that is not sufficient enough, because there are no similar
companies.  Every company has different  bargaining  methods and advantages  and financial  and
economical situations as well as market positioning.
Once again, the only opportunity is to assess the bigger picture and come up with a reasonable
conclusion.  In  China,  the burden of proof is  so high,  that  reasonable  royalty  is  skipped nearly
always  because  of  these  reasons.  Another  reason  to  remove  the  hierarchy,  that  often  leads  to
statutory calculation with an unreasonably low cap.
It is also questionable to base the whole basis of reasonable compensation to reasonable royalty. As
this is one of the hardest things to accurately prove, it should be a part of the bigger picture, instead
of the minimum, and sometimes only available amount, like in Finland.
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5.4. Statutory damages
Statutory  damages  are  only available  in  China.  Because of  the  indecisiveness  or  absurdly high
burden of proof or various other reasons, it is the most used way to calculate damages and the most
unfair. It gives the illusion of overall assessment, when in reality, it is severely limiting with its low
cap. Even the Supreme Court in China has noticed this problem, but courts are still  hesitant to
breach the cap, even with Supreme Court’s blessing. There would be no need for this statutory chart
in my proposed system of extensive assessment of the overall situation without limiting caps.
Statutory damages would not be a huge problem without the cap. Since in China it is difficult to
prove anything, there has to be a way to at least reward some damages. This is certainly not the best
practice available though. Some might say that minimum compensation in the form of reasonable
royalty fee is the same as statutory damages by principle. They would be right in the sense, that
both are calculated without concrete evidence and serve as the minimum available remedy. Overall,
I do not see any use to have statutory damages as an option in my proposed system.
5.5. Negligence
Negligence,  gross  negligence,  minor  negligence  and  intentional  infringements  should  all  be
considered differently and distinguished clearly in the laws of Finland and China. Both laws have
currently no distinction between willful and negligent infringements. Only time negligence is even
mentioned is minor negligence in Finnish law. Minor negligence gives the opportunity to mitigate
the damages. This is a very good provision, that could possibly solve the lack of concrete evidence
requirement in Chinese law. If damages can not be proven well enough, mitigating factors could be
taken into consideration, if level of negligence is low.
On the  other  hand,  if  the  level  of  negligence  is  very  high,  more  options  should  be  available.
Depending on the case, multipliers or added bonuses could be added to close the gap on damages
that can be proven and damages that may have occurred but have not been proven. At first glance,
this may be against the principle of full compensation, but negotiating with a party who willfully
infringes patents would, in reality, lead to higher license fee. It is the same thing in criminal or tort
law. Higher culpability and level of negligence leads to higher convictions and damages. Parties are
not equal and should not be equal, if the other party intends to breach the contract or in this case, the
presumed  license  agreement.  The  whole  reasonable  royalty  discussion  changes  with  a  willful
opposite party.
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As stated before, being negligent in most industries is quite easy. The difference between negligent
and normal behavior in the field of patents is very thin, because very few people truly know enough
about patents and technology to capably examine all competitors’ patent portfolios and adjusts their
research and development efforts to avoid infringements. Companies who have managed to do this
have usually a group of experts, whose only job is to read competitors patents. Even that is not
enough for global companies who operate in countries like China and India and may have hundreds
of competitors.
Minor negligence should have very little culpability and consequences. Problem is that difference
between minor or normal negligence is difficult to determine, since normal negligence itself has
quite low culpability too. Thorough examination of all the evidence and circumstances is once again
the  key.  It  should  be  more  clearly  distinguished  however  that  minor  negligence  gives  minor
damages. This is not a major problem in either of the countries though. Both have the culture of
avoiding too large damage amounts more greatly than too little.
5.6. Discovery of evidence
Basic principle in civil law is that parties themselves acquire the evidence they need for the case.
Another basic principle is the contradictory principle. It grants parties the right to be heard on any
claims presented against them. This should also include the right to receive all the needed evidence
for making those claims. This is not the case in patent infringement trials. Parties usually want to
keep  all  evidence  to  themselves  to  avoid  giving  any  kind  of  competitive  edge  to  their  rivals.
Records of sold goods are kept in every single company, but somehow, they are often not found
when  the  opponent  would  ask  for  them.  Same  thing  happens  with  the  documentation  on  the
manufacturing methods. Every single company knows how their products are manufactured,  yet
nobody seems to have any proof.
If these basic principles are not followed, why should any other principles be followed? How can
there be any reasonable or full compensation or even a burden of proof if you can not get the proof?
The whole Chinese system is based on sufficient proof, yet not on sufficient discovery of proof. The
courts in China even have a time limit for production of evidence, which varies from 30 to 60 days.
The other party can simply stall for a month and avoid the whole request with ease. Effective and
fast litigation process is naturally a good thing but taking into consideration the fact that patent trials
are very long, it is safe to say that it does not make a difference in the grand scheme if production of
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evidence is done in 30 days or 100. It makes it very difficult for foreign litigators to acquire the
evidence, translations and other formalities on time.
Argument  against  the  longer  evidence  production  period  would  be  that  evidence  should  be
produced before the filing of the infringement claim. Some of the evidence would definitely be
feasible  to  obtain  before  the  filing  but  pending  infringement  claim  creates  the  right  to  obtain
evidence from the infringer. There is no way to get some of the evidence without suing and without
the 30 day-time-limit.       
Preliminary injunction claim is also a good way to deal with the situation, but the plaintiff has to
produce evidence for that too. Overall the discovery of evidence lacks authority in both countries.
Both of my case law examples demonstrated that key pieces of evidence were not recovered. This
could be rectified with more authoritative officials.  It  could limit  the privacy and protection of
proprietary information and courts would be very hesitant to do that. In the current way evidence
can not be recovered efficiently.
Chapter VI
6. Final conclusions
6.1. Current state and predictions
Comparing two very different legal environments in a complex field such as patents is hard. Finland
lives under European Union’s shadow and has a history of only very minor changes in patent law
and especially  damages,  while  China  is  going through reform after  reform in  constant  turmoil
towards being the patenting capital of the world. Both countries would rather reward damages too
low than grant any undue compensation due to bad judgments by the judges.
Finland has no power in  the European Union or outside it  to  shape the patent  law in a better
direction, while China is the country with most money, power and patent holders to rule the world.
If China would develop a solid patent litigation procedure, which would result in full compensation
being paid, rest of the world would possibly follow in their footsteps. Since the Chinese courts
themselves can not even apply their own current procedure in practice, it is hard to see anybody else
following.  Recent  developments  have  shown  also  another  way.  The  American  way.  Chinese
government has started to talk about punitive damages among other reforms in the midst of a raging
trade-war  against  the  United  States.  The  power-struggle  between  these  two  superpowers  will
continue to shape both patent law and the world economy in the future. Hopefully as a result we
53
could see a mixture of the Chinese caution and American grandiose, with a spice of North-European
stability and longevity.
Both China and Finland are restricting the options for the courts to assess every aspect of the case in
order to determine sufficient damages. They set artificial minimum or maximum boundaries as if
the judges should not be trusted to make the right decision. Perhaps it is so. Top experts in the field
of patent law are not drawn to courts. I have heard leading experts say that a patent infringement
trial is a flip of a coin. Risks of losing everything and gaining nothing are imminent and the attorney
costs are very high. It is often a better idea to keep your inventions as secrets than to risk publishing
them and losing in court. Arbitration and mitigation are much safer, cheaper and faster than court
proceedings.  Patent holders also prefer  arbitration over courts  because of this.  Expertise  of the
arbitrators is also usually far greater than that of courts.
6.2. How to reward full compensation for patent infringement?
I  will  systematize  my idea with several  steps,  that  need to  be executed,  but do not  exclude or
overlap with other steps. First step is to determine injuries as accurately as possible. Second step is
to effectively collect all relevant evidence from the infringing party and any other party that may
possess  evidence  related  to  the  infringement.  Third  step  is  to  determine  undue  profits  for  the
infringer. Fourth step is to determine a suitable license rate for the patent. Sixth step is to determine
the level of negligence. Seventh step is the general assessment of the success in previous steps.
After these seven steps, the court weighs these components against each other to determine the
overall damages and the best possible solution in each case.
A common principle, when different methods are considered is that they should not be accumulated
to  constitute  unreasonable  amounts  of  damages.56 In  practice,  this  means  that  you  can  assess
different methods together, but you cannot add undue profits to reasonable royalty fee, if you have
not made the assessment of the royalty fee based on those profits. There are no rules prohibiting a
more comprehensive consideration. In theory, all the methods can be assessed simultaneously or in
a specific order, as long as the outcome is reasonable and constitutes full compensation for caused
injuries. 
6.2.1. Determination of injuries
It  is  very important  to  determine all  injuries  before initiating  any lawsuits.  It  will  significantly
improve the possibility of recovering the relevant evidence later on, when the case is pending.  This
56 Castren, M. 1978. Vahingonkorvaus immateriaalioikeudessa. pp.146. Helsinki. Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys.
54
is naturally not an issue for courts or legislators, but a more strategical guideline for the future
plaintiff.  Preparation also negates  the time needed to collect  and find the relevant  evidence.  In
China, there is a very short time frame for evidence collection, with strict formal requirements that
take time to execute.  All of the evidence from the plaintiff’s side should be ready and in order
before filing the suit. In China, this means legalization and translation of all the evidence. These
formalities may take time, that is very limited, after filing the suit.
In  order  to  have  any evidence,  it  is  important  to  keep records  of  sales  and all  the costs  from
patenting and research & development. In companies, that have vast international patent portfolios,
this is hard to organize. The more documentation you have, the better chances you will have of
proving the infringement and the injuries it has caused.  
In this stage it is also very important to establish, whether the whole infringement matter could be
resolved in any other manner than court proceedings. The best way to calculate full compensation is
to not go to court at all. Settlement or arbitration are far more safer options and often times more
beneficial  and cheaper.  It  also helps to  preserve the relationship with the infringer,  since these
alternate methods of dispute resolution are more civilized and humane way of solving these issues.
Who knows, the patent holder may want to merge or own the infringer in the future or do business
with them. Bad relations are bad for business.
6.2.2. Effective recovery of evidence from the infringer
There are international (TRIPS) and national regulations in place for this in theory. In practice, they
are not utilized57 or not effective enough to secure all relevant evidence. In order to differentiate the
relevant evidence and collect it,  there needs to be a plan. Since the facilities of a company are
usually  private  properties,  the  plan  is  not  going  to  be  perfect.  Trade  secrets  and  proprietary
information unrelated to the case is in great danger for disclosure in these recovery raids.  This
makes the option of not informing the infringer a huge risk. Still, since the infringement or great
danger for it has been established at this point, I think that the privacy of the alleged infringer can
be carefully violated in order to secure the important evidence. However, under no circumstances
should  the  plaintiff  roam  freely  in  their  competitors’  premises.  Recovery  must  always  be  a
controlled endeavor.
On  the  other  hand,  the  plaintiff  may  want  to  safeguard  their  own trade  secrets  and  withhold
evidence themselves. This is almost as likely as the infringer’s need to keep their secrets. Since the
57 Sulin,  H.  2014.  Todistelun  turvaamista  koskeva  laki  vähällä  käytöllä.  IPRinfo  2:2014.  [Online].  [Assessed  26
September 2018]. Available from: http://www.iprinfo.fi/
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trials are mostly public, the opposition in court is not the only party necessarily to find out about the
information presented to the court.
6.2.3. Determining undue profits for the infringer
In order to succeed in this determination, the first two steps need to be completed and evidence of
the undue profits acquired. The period of time for this evidence is from the filing date of the patent
application to present moment. This can be anywhere between 1 and 20 years. The longer the time,
the harder it will be to collect the evidence. More evidence equals more time needed to search for
the evidence. Another problem is, that the evidence may have been lost completely. Sales figures
from 20 years are not something that are usually available. Back then archives were in paper form
and during the transformation into current digitized era, only the most important documents and
archives were scanned or digitized through other methods.
Currently Finnish law has regulated a 5 year time for damages, counted from the date of filing of
the infringement suit. Only way to go around this is if the infringement happened within 1 year after
the opposition period. This regulation is absurd and basically renders the period in force for patents
a lot shorter than 20 years. This does not have basis in any international treaties. It is only there to
make  infringing worth  the  effort.  China  has  no  such regulation  in  its’  laws.  To take  this  into
consideration,  patent  holder  should  focus  their  competitor  surveillance  in  the  year  after  the
opposition period has ended. This could be seen as beneficial to patent holders who have very little
resources to use for surveillance. They can focus all their efforts into a single year instead of all 20.
Even so, I still think this limitation is in conflict with the rest of the patent law and with the patent
right itself. It gives competitors the opportunity to infringe patents for free for up to 15 years.
When determining the undue profits, it needs to be remembered, that the infringer is profiting also
because they did not pay for the development of the patented invention. This very important matter
is usually never discussed in court  during the damages calculations.  Research and development
costs can be millions for the project that resulted in the invention that was patented. Useful way to
calculate this profit would be to first count the proportion of the invention inside the research and
development  project.  Then just  divide that  sum by 2 and you have the price for the infringers
contribution.
The same method should be used to calculate the profits for not paying for the prosecution of the
patent application. First add up all the patent office fees and attorney fees and divide the amount by
2. If the patent was applied in only the country, where it was infringed, the calculations are done for
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the case. If not, one should only use the prosecution costs for that particular country and divide
those by 2 to get the costs for shared prosecution. 
Often neglected way of profiting are also the maintenance fees for keeping the patent in force.
Those should also be determined from the country, where the patent is infringed and then divided
by 2. If there are more than 2 patent holders, these amounts could be divided by the number of
patent holders added with the infringer. 
More problems arise, if the price for the product including the patent is low in the market compared
to the costs referenced above. This could indicate that no profit, or very little profit were made, even
if all the costs were avoided. Naturally, value of the invention inside the product decreases over
time, when factors such as brand, customer satisfaction, market demand among other things come
in to play. This is one of the reasons why all steps are part of the big picture that can not be assessed
mathematically  in  every  occasion.  Judges  need  to  thoroughly  examine  lots  of  variables  and
dependencies.
Profit can also be made by sales. Profit margin is calculated by adding up the manufacturing and
marketing costs and deducting this sum from the sales price. Value of the profit that is solely caused
by the patent inside the product is not so easily defined. In some industries or products, invention
itself can boost the sales price and increase the profits significantly. Sometimes the patent is a minor
improvement and only adds little value. Since the infringement is solely against the invention and
not the product, the value of the patented invention is the only value that matters. Proportional size
could be one factor. If the invention is the product itself, calculations are a little easier. This is not
often  the  case.  Currently  technology  advances  usually  by  minor  improvements  to  the  existing
technology. Customer demand can add great value to the invention. Having high demand is not
always a sign of valuable invention. It just means that customers need it and due to the patent, could
not buy it from anywhere else.
To conclude, it is important to understand the value of the invention and the proportion of profits
that relate to the invention. The fact that the infringer makes profit at all, indicates that the invention
is not widely known to be a patent by the market. Usually more valuable patents gain publicity and
prestige.  In some countries,  they are granted  as Standard Essential  Patents  (SEP).  They are so
disruptive, that licensing them becomes mandatory. Often times courts only get the sales figures
without proof of the proportional value of the inventions. Courts will have to make up a percentage
based on that specific industry and market.   
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6.2.4. Determining losses for the patent holder
Now that evidence has been recovered and undue profits determined, it is time to calculate the
losses. As previously stated, moral injuries are very hard to prove, but important none the less.
Statistics on sales are not enough to prove that the lack of sales activity was solely caused by the
infringement. Thorough analysis for the market in question has to be made. Trends in the industry
and  better  or  more  cheaper  technology  could  just  as  well  be  reasons  for  lacking  sales.  Bad
marketing, sales personnel or mistakes in public relations can cause decrease of sales just as well.
Good combination of evidence would be the sales figures combined with sales figures from the
infringer. Best case scenario would be client specific numbers but those can be protected as trade
secrets. If patent holder can prove that their loss is infringers gain with the same client, losses are
easier to prove as being caused by the infringement directly. If the evidence is not available, the
court has to make an assessment based on the information at hand. Skipping this phase should never
be an option, like in China.
Moral  injuries  could  be  proven  by advertising  materials  and  market  behavior  of  the  infringer.
Witness testimonies can be used to describe behavior and possible lies by the infringer in customer
meetings. Lesser quality manufacturing or materials could be proven from the infringing products
themselves. Lesser quality products could lessen the value of the patent holder’s company and their
products for their customers. The products could also cause environmental hazards that would not
have  occurred  with  the  original  patented  product.  These  could  be  proven  by  test  results.
Environmental issues are very important for technology companies nowadays and if neglected, can
cause serious damages for reputation.  If no evidence is provided, the court can not assess these
issues in my opinion. It is too risky to determine moral injuries in the same manner as financial
ones. My solution for moral injuries is to only include them, when proven.
6.2.5. Determining reasonable royalty
As previously stated, reasonable royalty has a very different role in Finland than in China. Both of
these roles have pros and cons. I would not use reasonable royalty as the minimum damages, since
there may or may not be any practice or median value around. Licensing is only one of the ways to
monetize  patents  and  some  patent  holders  never  do  it  in  the  traditional  way  by  licensing  to
competitors. Calculation of the value of reasonable royalty is a good way to determine the value of
the patent, but not the ultimate and best way. I still think efforts to calculate it should be made.
Main difference between a royalty and a license is that royalty is only possible from sold products.
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In a way, reasonable royalty is the same thing as undue profits for the infringer and at the same
time, due profits for the patent holder.
License  agreement  can  determine  a  lump sum unrelated  to  sales.  Negotiating  power and other
variables affect the value greatly, whereas royalty is usually a fixed percentage. License agreement
can also be in the form of royalty agreement. License fee is usually the value of the patent to the
competitor and gives fairly accurate estimate for the market value of the invention. If available, a
license agreement with a competitor other than the infringer would be great evidence to base the
damages on.
Chinese  law  offers  the  option  of  multipliers  to  reasonable  royalty.  There  is  no  connection  to
culpability mentioned, but it could be used to punish infringers based on their level of negligence.
Intentional  infringements  could be punished with double royalties  or even triple  royalties.  One
could argue, that the only instance to punish infringers this way should be the criminal court, since
the patent holder should not gain more than it is due. Others could argue that infringement trials are
so expensive and uncertain as well as difficult in terms of damage calculation, that an extra reward
would balance out these risks of otherwise too low damages.   There are other ways to do this and
using a multiplier is probably not the best.
Good solution is to examine the evidence and try to determine a possible royalty fee. If there is not
enough evidence or common practices from the industry, courts could determine a new policy for
that  industry  or  use  other  ways.  It  should  not  be  a  minimum reward  or  standard  to  base  the
calculations. Still, if it can be done easily and accurately, it is one of the best ways and can even be
used as the only calculation method.
6.2.6. Effects of culpability
There needs to  be a clear  separation of negligent,  accidental  and willful  infringements  and the
damages for each of them. There is no such distinction in current patent law of China. European law
and Finnish law have established systems for this, but still every European country has different
regulations.  Harmonization efforts  have been failures  among TRIPS parties as well.  Meanwhile
trademark  laws  have  been  harmonized  quite  well  at  least  around  Europe.  Reasons  for  such
differences  have  been  national  customs  and  practices.  These  same  reasons  have  not  stopped
harmonization of trademark laws but somehow are really important regarding patents.
Universal opinion seems to be that culpability matters and accidental infringement should not be
calculated  the  same  way  as  willful  infringement.  Options  seem  to  be  punitive  damages  or
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multipliers to royalty fees for willful infringement. Regular damages based on profits, losses and
royalties  for  negligent  infringements.  Finally,  some  kind  of  reasonable  assessment  for  minor
negligence and accidents.
Noteworthy  cultural  difference  between  Finland  and  China  is  the  criminality  of  intentional
infringements. In Finland, it is possible to sue the infringer for industrial right crime in criminal
court. This indicates that the state clearly sees intentional infringements as serious crimes against
both the state and the patent holder. China does not offer such an option at all. This is too lenient
approach towards intentional infringements. Only counterfeiting patents is criminalized in China.
This basically excludes all process or method patents entirely out of the scope of criminal behavior.
It is impossible in general to counterfeit intellectual property such as the right to prevent others
from utilizing your invention. This can be interpreted to mean that, China sees the actual intellectual
property  as  less  valued and worthy of  protection,  than  the  physical  results  of  such intellectual
property right.
Criminal proceedings give an important tool on top of damages, fines. Fines can be sentenced on
top  of  the  damages  to  fairly  punish  the  infringer  without  undue  benefits  to  the  patent  holder.
Problem with a district court in Finland handling patent infringement is the lack of expertise. There
are no technical expert judges in district court. There are however at most two experts consulting
the judges. Requirements for these experts are university degree, experience in patent matters, or
optionally knowledge of economics and marketing. It is possible to have a marketing expert instead
of a patent expert according to law58. In practice this does not happen fortunately. So the argument
of lacking expertise of criminal courts can be settled with legislation. Still, one of my arguments
throughout  this  thesis  has  been,  that  even  specialized  courts  lack  the  expertise  to  assess
infringement cases and calculate damages. If done correctly, criminal proceedings could be a great
addition to China as well.
Latest  developments  seem  to  indicate  the  adoption  of  punitive  damages.  Something  that  the
European Union will probably never do. Pressure from the United States is much harder for China
than for Finland, which have led to reformation more towards the US system. This is a rapid change
from the overly cautious current system of nearly always calculating the statutory minimal amounts.
I do not think that this fast development will suit the Chinese system at all. Still, they have the tools
for fast developments and the financial resources to make them happen.
58See  Tuomioistuinlaki  2016.  (c17).  Finnish  Government.  Helsinki.  See  also  Patenttilaki  1967.  (c9).  Finnish
Government. Helsinki.
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Negligent infringements are more common and harmonization could be easier. Current situation
remains very different however. Role of royalty fee is exaggerated in Finland and optional in China.
There seems to be no difference in the procedure in China, whether the infringement is negligent,
willful or accidental. In Finland patent holder can sue the infringer in district court, but if they do
not,  the  procedure  is  identical  to  negligent  infringement.  Criminal  proceedings  are  completely
optional and hardly benefit the patent holder. Solution would be a clear distinction on culpability
and more flexible methods to assess the damages amount itself. Courts are already choosing the
most  flexible  method  of  statutory  damages  in  China,  where  there  are  no  concrete  methods  of
calculations, just a general assessment of the case. Sometimes less regulation and more freedom is
better, as long as the court can reason their methods to the parties and to the public as well. 
In the cases of accidental infringement, court should not be the venue at all. There are mediation
and other options available in both countries and in China, mediation is even stated as the first step
before anything else will be done in infringement cases. It benefits nobody to litigate such matters.
In Finland, the reasonable compensation is only mentioned and no gesture towards mediation is
offered. In practice, this mediation happens in the court by mediating the damages. There is also the
option of mediation instead of the court proceedings, but it is not mentioned in relevant laws related
to patents.
Culpability has been ignored for too long. There needs to be clear distinction and clearly different
procedures  and  methods  for  each  level  of  culpability.  Methods  outside  of  courts  should  be
advertised  more  especially  with  cases  of  minor  negligence  or  purely  accidental  circumstances.
Deterrence and harsher punishments in severe infringements should also be emphasized more.
6.2.7. Industry specific tailoring
Different industries have different preferences on what creates value for the invention.  In some
industries, sustainability or decreased environmental hazards can be more valued traits compared to
increased safety or functionality of the invention. Pharmaceuticals for example have an aspect of
benefiting the common good. A cure for cancer would be so beneficial that exclusive rights could
be limited greatly to combat the disease. In order for judges to understand the case better, they have
to learn about the industry and its specific characteristics.
Despite  its  fundamental  importance,  this  is  never  mentioned  in  the  legal  texts.  Some industry
specific  laws  have  been  made  to  cover  pharmaceuticals,  but  I  will  not  address  them  in  the
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framework of this thesis. I will go through couple of industries, that have very distinct features,
such as mobile phone industry and mining industry. Both are important for Finland and China.
Mobile  phone  industry  is  known  for  its  high  rate  of  cross-licensing.  This  means  that  direct
competitors  use  each  others  technology  in  their  products.  Due  to  similarities  of  the  overall
technology in mobile phones, this is a must. One mobile phone can include hundreds of patents that
are licensed to all the biggest companies in the industry. License value is a much better nominator
in mobile phone industry than in the mining industry.
Mining industry is more famous for the lack of traditional  licensing between competitors.  New
innovations are kept secret or patented to solely utilize the exclusive right. The competitive edge is
not achieved through licensing, but through better sales numbers and higher quality technology than
competitors. Sustainability and safety of the technology is also much more important in mining
industry.  Often times mines  and mineral  processing facilities  are  dangerous and the substances
included vary form acids  to molten  metals  and cyanide.  Safety and efficiency of the patented
technology far outweighs the license value, when calculating the true value, these factors should be
taken into account.
Courts  use  industry  experts  to  assist  and give  testimonies  in  order  to  understand  these  special
nominators. Still, judges have to trust these experts, since especially in Finland, courts have so few
infringement  cases,  that  they  may  not  have  any  knowledge  of  a  certain  industry  beforehand.
Without their own point of view, judges cannot truly contest the experts on their views. This may
result to misinformed decisions. China has specialized courts just for intellectual property rights
cases, so the standard of expertise should be higher. There are also many more infringement cases
so the level of experience and variety of industries represented should not be a problem.
Since  the  different  industries  are  so  varied,  common  regulations  are  impossible  to  include  in
legislation, but judges should be the experts, rather than depend on them. This can even be the case
at  times,  since  the  industry  experts  sometimes  become  judges.  To  ensure  proper  skills  and
knowledge, training is a better option than legislative means surely. This training has undoubtedly
been organized in both countries. Even state run initiatives have been made especially in China to
further improve the competence of judges in specialized intellectual property courts. 
6.2.8. Conclusion
Current legal state of damages for patent infringements around the world and especially in Finland
and in China is  best  described by lack of harmonization,  evident  cultural  conflicts  and lack of
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certainty.  Despite  several  international  treaties  and  multilateral  agreements,  no  unity  has  been
achieved. Best practices are hard to define and developments are very slow in most countries. China
seems  to  be  the  country  playing  catch  up,  or  some might  even  see  China  as  a  forerunner  of
something new and better. They certainly have the will and funds for it.
Worldwide  uniformity  is  probably  not  possible  or  even  recommendable,  due  to  very  different
cultures, financial and industrial differences and judicial systems. Also the size-difference of China
compared to most countries is vastly different. TRIPS agreement has set up a vague foundation for
determining some of  the necessities  for damages determination,  but  it  is  simply not  enough to
guarantee the best, or even adequate possible execution in local courts of its member states.
Steps have been taken to better  the overall  protection of patent rights in problematic  areas like
China and the future will definitely see many more reforms. Finland is not the hot spot for patent
infringements so reforms will hardly be expected to occur, even if needed. Realistic expectation is
to never see a uniform legislation in the field of damages for patent infringement between Finland
and China.
Europe as a region will unify somewhat, if the new Unified Patent Court establishes itself as the
new go to patent  litigation court  in Europe.  Still,  due to applicable law being the national  law
preferred  by the parties,  no harmonized case law will  be formed.  The end results  are  possibly
exactly the same as before in national courts. The UPC-agreement does nothing new to damages
assessments, so we will have to wait for the actual case law to see, if any development will be made
and which directions the court will take.
As long as the United States have their very different and distinct system and their own demands for
the Chinese Patent Law, there is no incentive for China to adopt even a fully harmonized European
system for their patent disputes. Latest developments have also shown, that China has taken actions
towards harmonizing their system with the United States. Ne additions of evidence discovery and
punitive damages are coming with the new Fourth Amendment of Chinese Patent Law. It is very
hard to believe that the European Union would ever adopt the American way into a part of the EU
Law, so harmonization is highly unlikely in that regard as well. 
This study has shown that uniformity may not be possible or pursued and even if uniformity would
be achieved, it could lead to bad results. There are however things that are very important to get
right, in order to have a good system for damages calculation. Most important is the competent and
educated assessment of the entire case, not only profits or losses or any individual aspect. Also
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important is to have the best possible evidence to actually do the assessment. Only after these steps
can true justice be served to patent holders.
Currently a patent right is probably the weakest it has ever been. With the internet, anyone can find
patents  from  free  databases  provided  by  national  patent  offices.  Big  corporations  can  bully
inventors from start ups or mid size companies by simply hiring better lawyers or settling the case
with money. Keeping inventions as trade secrets has become more and more popular and safer way
to protect know-how. Even trade secret protection is often not enough, since key employees change
companies all the time and bring their knowledge of trade secrets with them to the new employers.
High technology industries have become minefields,  where every action brings more risks than
benefits for small companies trying to enter to markets with their groundbreaking inventions. As the
world keeps developing, legislators need to catch up and develop with it. One way to revive the
patent right and its strength, is to improve regulations on damage calculation. There are numerous
other ways to do it as well, but they will be subjects for other studies. 
This Thesis has been a huge challenge for me due to my more practical  mindset to most legal
issues. Taking a more scientific approach to these issues has taught me a lot. Time will only tell, if
my arguments and preferences will be seen in the future in some form in China or Finland. Only
one thing is for certain. Changes will come soon in China. It will be interesting to see, whether the
new reforms will change anything. 
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